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Abstract
Public opinion polls have shown the public lacks confidence in U.S. police to use
appropriate amounts of force and treat racial minorities fairly, which undermines police
legitimacy and the quality of life of all citizens. Although rules have been shown to
positively constrain police uses of force, researchers have not demonstrated the effect of
rules on racially influenced policing (RIP). In 2005, the RIP directive which prohibits
officers from using race as a factor in taking discretionary actions was promulgated in
New Jersey. The purpose of this study was to determine through the theoretical lens of
Lipsky’s street-level bureaucrat theory the influence of the RIP directive on municipal
police officer uses of force upon non-Whites. A quantitative nonexperimental
retrospective design was used to examine a stratified, proportionate random sample of
301 use of force reporting forms from municipal police agencies in one New Jersey
county for a 5-year period before and after the enactment of the RIP directive. A binomial
logistic regression indicated that the RIP directive had no influence on the use of force
upon non-Whites. Suspect race did not significantly influence force outcomes. Scholarly
implications include producing research based upon existing policy to better help inform
evidence-based policymaking. Policy implications include police practitioners and
policymakers actively monitoring officer uses of force for racial bias and broadening
their examination to other issues affecting the problem of trust. Implications for social
change include framing the problem within the public policy paradigm to promote
political discourse, evidence-based decision making, and improved civilian oversight of
the police, which could strengthen trust and police legitimacy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
In the United States, citizens have a social contract with their government to
protect their security. Individuals have largely sacrificed their implied right to use force
for their protection by granting that right to the government—more specifically, the
police—resulting in a net gain in freedom from victimization by others (Dunham &
Alpert, 2015; Pollock & Reynolds, 2015). The legitimacy of policing is threatened,
however, when officers misuse that authority. Recent highly publicized incidents of
deadly force and in-custody deaths have further damaged the public’s trust in the police
(Jones, 2015). Public policymakers and police practitioners must take steps to restore that
trust. Such steps must be evidence-based, using the best available research to identify
what works and the gaps where evidence is insufficient so that policies can be improved
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014).
This study was intended to contribute to the body of knowledge needed to address
police-civilian trust by examining the influence of the New Jersey rule prohibiting
racially influenced policing (RIP) on police uses of force. Central to this study is the
concept of street-level bureaucrat theory (SLBT; Lipsky, 2010); specifically, the use of
rules to constrain the discretion of public servants. The study contributes to positive
social change by bridging the scholar-practitioner divide to provide public policy and
police practitioners with an evidence-based assessment of the effectiveness of an
administrative rule to prevent racially disparate outcomes within the framework of its
implementation. In addition, the study was designed to determine the value of the New
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Jersey RIP policy as a model to promote the equal treatment of minority populations for
other police agencies. Further, this dissertation can serve as an example of how civilians
can use open public records laws to gather records and provide oversight of their police
agencies.
In this chapter, I provide a review of this study and a background of the current
problem, establish the purpose and nature of the study, and review the study’s theoretical
framework. I also furnish the research question, hypotheses, and important definitions.
Finally, I discuss the assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance
of this research.
Background
On August 9, 2014, police shot an unarmed Black teenager in Ferguson, MO,
resulting in a wave of anger and accusations that police unfairly target racial minorities
for unjust violence, specifically Blacks (Smith, 2016). Other high-profile incidents in the
middle of the decade involved deadly force or in-custody deaths in New York City,
Cleveland, OH; Bridgeton, NJ; North Charleston, SC; Baltimore, MD; Chicago, IL; and
Charlotte, NC, prompting public calls for increased police accountability. Some groups
demanded that police agencies be defunded by their municipalities (Smith, 2016;
Melendez, 2016; Thrasher, 2016; U.S. Department of Justice [U.S. DOJ], 2014, 2015a,
2015b, 2015c, 2016a; 2016b; Yan & Karimi, 2016). After each incident, protests
materialized. Some erupted into violent riots, causing widespread physical and economic
destruction in the local community (Bredderman, 2014; Kent, 2015; Morice, 2015; Ortiz,
2015; Yan & Karimi, 2016). In a few cases, random officers who were not involved in
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the original incident were assassinated by people acting out against killings by police
officers (Carrero, 2016; Fieldstadt, 2014; U.S DOJ., 2016).
The issue of police killings of Blacks in the United States has also drawn the
attention of the United Nations, where a report was made to the General Assembly
indicating, “Contemporary police killings and the trauma that they create are reminiscent
of the past racial terror of lynching. Impunity for State violence has resulted in the current
human rights crisis and must be addressed as a matter of urgency” (Working Group of
Experts on People of African Descent, 2016, p. 16). The strain in the relationship
between the police and civilians, particularly racial minorities, cannot be overstated, nor
can the destructiveness of the social and political consequences be overlooked.
The power of government is granted by civilians, and it does have the potential
for abuse. But only anecdotal evidence suggests of widespread abuse of police power
(House Judiciary Committee, 2016). Montesquieu (2011) provided an assessment of the
corruptibility of power when he explained that experience has demonstrated that those
with unlimited power are inclined to abuse it. This has been true in policing, such as
when paid civil servants engaged in slave patrols to brutally enforce slave codes prior to
the application of the 14th Amendment to the states. Other examples abound of officers
abusing their power when using force (Fried, 1999; Sanchez, 2016). Still, these and other
examples represent a small number of police-civilian encounters, making the claim of
widespread abuse difficult to support. Despite the insufficiency of the evidence, civilian
confidence and trust in the police are low (Jones, 2015).
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Administrative rules and laws have been promulgated throughout the United
States, prohibiting police abuses of power. The purpose of such actions is to improve
public confidence in the criminal justice system, unify society, and foster trust and
support for criminal justice efforts. New Jersey was the first state in the nation to outlaw
RIP (New Jersey Office of the Attorney General [NJOAG], 2005a, 2005b). This
prohibition is supported by criminal statutes to prosecute officers found engaging in its
exercise (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-2; 2C:30-7). Research has shown that administrative rules
are effective in constraining many police actions (Alpert & Dunham, 1990; Fyfe, 1978,
1979; Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). Still, researchers have not examined the ability of rules
to eliminate RIP. This gap represents a significant gulf between researchers and
practitioners, as practitioners must ensure the equal protection of all civilians and require
evidence-based solutions to achieve that end. The concept of equal protection is
paramount to citizens’ social contract with the government, and that contract is vital to
the legitimacy of government. Through this study, I provided an empirical assessment of
the scope of police violence during a 10-year period in New Jersey, filled the research
gap by examining the data for evidence of RIP during uses of force before and after the
promulgation of the RIP directive, and provided needed evidence-based information
required by government officials and police practitioners to judge the effectiveness of the
New Jersey RIP directive.
Problem Statement
In the United States, public trust in the police is waning, prompting a need for the
government to take action to restore citizen trust. While a majority of the population
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remains confident in the police enterprise, a substantial portion of society believes that
police use inappropriate amounts of force and unfairly treat racial minorities (Jones,
2015; Pew Research Center, 2015). This problem impacts all of society because it
undermines the legitimacy and authority of the police and government, and threatens the
quality of life of all citizens, particularly racial minorities (Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett,
& Tyler, 2013; Rosenbaum, Lawrence, Hartnett, McDevitt, & Posick, 2015; Tyler, 2004;
White House, 2016; Wolfe, Nix, Kaminski, & Rojek, 2015). Intense media coverage of
the deaths of several Black men at the hands of police has likely contributed to this
problem (Jones, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2015). In response, the federal government
has recommended to all police agencies several methods to improve the public trust,
including the imperative rule to prohibit RIP (President's Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, 2015; Weitzer, 2015). New Jersey prohibited RIP in 2005 (NJOAG, 2005a,
2005b). Research has shown that administrative rules have been effective in controlling
officer uses of non-deadly and deadly force and vehicle pursuit (Alpert & Dunham, 1990;
Fyfe, 1978, 1979; Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). However, scholarly research has not
addressed the influence of administrative rules prohibiting RIP where implicit biases may
be unrecognized by officers and their supervisors, and where these implicit biases affect
official actions. This quantitative study builds upon previous studies of the influences of
administrative rules by examining the effect of the New Jersey RIP directive on officer
uses of force through the theoretical lens of Lipsky’s SLBT.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this retrospective quantitative nonexperimental study was to
examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive, which prohibits the use of race as
a factor in officer discretion, on officer uses of force in one New Jersey county to
determine if the policy altered force outcomes for non-Whites after its implementation.
This study controlled for subject, officer, and encounter characteristics found to be
significant in the previous scholarly use of force research. The extant literature has shown
that administrative rules are effective at constraining officer actions during critical
incidents involving force (see Anderson, Litzenberger, & Plecas, 2002; Fyfe, 1978, 1979;
Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). If rulemaking is effective at preventing RIP, then the
application of force should not disproportionately impact any racial category after the
RIP directive has been implemented.
Research Question and Hypothesis
I addressed the following research question in this study:
RQ1: How did the New Jersey RIP directive affect municipal police officer uses
of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county?
Ho1: The New Jersey RIP directive did not significantly affect municipal police
officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county.
Ha1: The New Jersey RIP directive did significantly affect municipal police
officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county.
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Theoretical Framework
SLBT provides the framework for this study. Lipsky (2010) explained that public
servants, whom he called SLBs, played an important role in society. These public
servants wield considerable discretion as they fulfill their official obligations (Lipsky,
2010). They are responsible for delivering the government benefits and sanctions that
structure and delimit the lives and opportunities of all citizens (Lipsky, 2010). Still, SLBs
must overcome limitations in fulfilling their roles, such as ambiguous policies and
insufficient resources (Lipsky, 2010). They may develop coping mechanisms contrary to
established policy and which collectively embody a de facto public policy (Lipsky,
2010). SLBT will be supplemented by the works of Davis, who examined the role of
rules in police work. A more detailed explanation of Lipsky and Davis’s work is
presented in Chapter 2.
Police officers are SLBs who are governed by policies and rules, but, in some
circumstances, a gap may exist between policies and rules and their intended outcomes.
Davis (1969, 1975) offered a widely accepted model within the police enterprise by
which officer discretion could be confined, structured, and checked. The New Jersey RIP
directive and use of force guidelines conform to the Davis model. In this study, I
examined the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on municipal police officers’
uses of force. The New Jersey use of force policy has at its foundation two factors: sound
judgment and the appropriate exercise of discretion (New Jersey Division of Criminal
Justice, 2000). As Lipsky (2010) explained, if officers engage in RIP while administering
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force contrary to stated policy, these actions might have resulted from stereotypes during
the exercise of their discretion.
Nature of the Study
The study was a quantitative non-experiment using publicly accessible
government records to examine the effectiveness of the New Jersey RIP directive in
preventing intentional discrimination and disparate impact when officers use force. Using
government records to investigate new research questions for which the data were not
originally intended is a well-established method in social science research (Heaton,
2004). Specifically, I used the New Jersey use of force reporting form to generate the
data. The form is generated to memorialize in public and criminal records the actions of
an officer each time force is used on a civilian. The reports are required by state law and
are created under the auspices of each police agency. While the report was not
specifically created to serve as a data collection instrument for this study, the data
contained within is well suited to examine the research problem.
The use of force reporting form collects data valuable to this line of research. Key
variables captured in the form include (a) the time period, which indicates the existence
of the RIP directive (independent variable); (b) force used by officers (dependent
variable), and (c) the suspect’s race (independent variable of interest). Other variables I
studied included (a) officer tenure, (b) suspect age, (c) suspect resistance, and (d) suspect
unusual conditions. Since the RIP directive outlaws the use of race as a factor in officer
discretion in determining how to treat people, I hypothesized that there would be an
interaction between the existence of the RIP directive and suspect race. By examining
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time periods before and after the promulgation of the RIP directive, my statistical
analysis determined the influence of the RIP directive and its interaction with a suspect’s
race on officer uses of force while controlling for suspect, officer, and encounter
characteristics. An in-depth discussion of the academic literature supporting the inclusion
of each of these variables is provided in Chapter 2.
The data were collected from municipal agencies within one anonymous New
Jersey county through open public records requests. This included all force reports
submitted to those agencies between June 2000 and June 2010. Data from municipal
police agencies were entered into an Excel spreadsheet and later analyzed using SPSS
version 21. The nature of the collected data resulted in the use of binomial logistic
regression to determine the likelihood of mechanical force and to determine if the RIP
guideline altered force outcomes for non-Whites after its implementation. A more
detailed discussion of the methodology and reasoning for the analysis is provided in
Chapter 3.
Definitions
Constructive authority: Actions or behaviors exhibited by a police officer which
do not involve physical contact or force directed upon a subject but which are intended to
induce the subject to submit to the officer’s authority (NJOAG, 2000).
Critical incidents: Sudden events that expose officers to physically dangerous
situations perceived to be outside the officer’s control and which overwhelm an officer’s
coping skills, causing immediate distress (Anderson et al., 2002; Evans & Coman, 1993;
Kureczka, 1996).
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Deadly force: Force directed upon a subject with the purpose of causing, or which
are known to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:3-11[b];
NJOAG, 2000).
Disparate impact: The denial of benefits to an individual of a particular race,
color, or national origin without substantial legitimate justification during the course of
implementing a neutral procedure or practice (Elston v. Talladega County Board of
Education, 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 7 F.3d 242 (11th Cir. 1993);
U.S. DOJ, 2001).
Encounter characteristics: Those features or qualities belonging exclusively to an
encounter, such as suspect actions and charges, type of incident, and the presence of a
weapon (Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV, Frank, & Liederbach, 2014).
Force: Lawful physical actions undertaken by police officers to protect persons or
property or to overcome suspect resistance during the execution of their public duties that
intentionally or unintentionally attempt or inflict physiological harm, impairment, or
death (NJOAG, 2000; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-14[b]; 2C:3-3 et seq.; 2C:3-7 et seq.; 2C:11-1
et seq.).
Imminent danger: Possibility of harm” that may occur during an encounter absent
action by the law enforcement officer”. (NJOAG, 2000, p. 4).
Intoxication: The experience “of a substantial deterioration or diminution of
mental faculties or physical capabilities” (State v. Tamburro, 346 A.2d 401, 68 N.J. 414,
1975).
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Mechanical force: Force in the form of “some device or substance, other than a
firearm, to overcome a subject’s resistance to the exertion of the law enforcement
officer’s authority” (NJOAG, 2000, p. 3).
Officer characteristics: Those features or qualities belonging exclusively to a
police officer, such as age, gender, and race (Bolger, 2014; Klahm et al., 2014).
Police officer: Any employed member of a municipal law enforcement agency
who possesses the statutory empowerment to detect, investigate, arrest, convict, detain, or
rehabilitate people for violations of New Jersey criminal laws or who has successfully
completed a Police Training Commission approved training course or an equivalent
training course (N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:14-118; 40A:14-146.9[h]; 40A:14-152; 40A:14152.1).
Physical contact: Actions by police officers involving the bodily touching of a
subject without force and which are routine or procedural in nature and necessary to
effectively accomplish lawful objectives (e.g., handcuffing) (NJOAG, 2000).
Physical force: Forceful actions by a police officer directed upon a subject which
are not examples of mechanical force or deadly force (NJOAG, 2000).
Public duties: Conduct required or authorized by law or court order (N.J. Stat.
Ann. 2C:3-3 et seq.).
Racially influenced policing (RIP): The use by police officers of a subject’s race
or ethnicity as a factor in drawing inferences or conclusions about the subject’s
involvement in criminal activity or as a factor in exercising discretion in stopping or
otherwise treating a person (NJOAG, 2005a).
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Racially influenced policing (RIP) directive: State policy prohibiting racially
influenced policing (NJOAG, 2005a).
Reasonable belief: An objective evaluation of “how a reasonable law enforcement
officer with comparable training and experience would react to, or draw inferences from,
the facts and circumstances confronting and known by the law enforcement officer at the
scene” (NJOAG, 2000, p. 3). Reasonable belief “designates a belief the holding of which
does not make the actor reckless or criminally negligent.” (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-14[j]).
Resistance: Passive, active, and violent actions and threats of such actions by
subjects refusal to comply with the lawful demands of officers (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:29-1 et
seq.; 2C:29-2 et seq.; NJOAG, 2000).
Serious bodily harm: Injury posing a “substantial risk of death or which causes
serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ” (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:3-11[d]; 2C:11-1[b]).
Suspect characteristics: Those features or qualities belonging exclusively to a
subject, such as age, gender, race, and unusual conditions (Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV et al.,
2014).
Unusual conditions: Mental state during which a subject suffers from impaired
judgment, such as those resulting from intoxication or other cognitive impairments or
psychological disorders.
Assumptions
I cannot demonstrate that certain aspects of this study were true, so several
assumptions were necessary regarding police uses of force in the studied county. First, I
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assumed that each agency promulgated their policies within the mandates of the NJOAG.
Second, I assumed that the officers reported all uses of force and that the reports were
truthfully completed. Third, various elements related to the circumstances regarding the
use of force reporting form were assumed. All uses of force were assumed to be lawful,
and unless otherwise indicated, all physical and mechanical force did not constitute
deadly force. When unusual conditions were documented, I assumed that those
conditions actually existed and were not merely present in the officer’s subjective
perceptions. Finally, I assumed that each police agency retained every use of force
reporting form submitted during the period being examined. These assumptions led to a
complete picture of force use in the studied county and could not otherwise be created
without access to records that are denied to the public by law. These are limitations
covered in greater detail later in this chapter.
Scope and Delimitations
Defining the scope of this research requires a brief discussion on the nature of
government and policing in New Jersey. The state is divided into 21 counties, each
consisting of several municipalities (State of New Jersey, 2016). The state and county
governments have one or more types of police agencies, each with a mission substantially
different from municipal police agencies. Generally, state and county police agencies
play a support role to municipalities, except that they may fulfill the municipal police role
in municipalities that do not have their own police department. Where municipal police
agencies exist, they maintain responsibility for routine police services within the entire
political boundary of the municipality (N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:14-118). All police agencies
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are overseen by the NJOAG. The attorney general is the chief law enforcement officer for
the state and may issue directives, guidelines, and policies to county prosecutors and all
law enforcement agencies (N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:17B-97 et seq.). Each county prosecutor
administers the rules promulgated by the attorney general but also maintains the authority
to establish rules for the county and municipal police agencies within his or her
jurisdiction (N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:17B-97 et seq.; County Prosecutor Study Commission,
2011).
In this study, I examined the municipal agencies in one New Jersey county,
specifically, the influence of the RIP directive on municipal police officer uses of force in
one New Jersey county between June 2000 and June 2010. Studying municipalities in one
county ensured a degree of consistency among the police agency rules and practices,
which may have affected force outcomes and might otherwise have been absent when
examining municipal agencies from more than one county. Consistency in rules and
practices was expected because all municipal agencies within the county were subject to
the authority and oversight of their county prosecutor. Excluding county and state
agencies was appropriate because their missions or operational limitations may be
substantially different than municipal agencies. This exclusion was needed to maintain
internal validity.
While consistency was expected among these municipal agencies, each agency
had the flexibility to make their rules more restrictive than those issued by the state and
prosecutor. Also, agencies may seek accreditation through The Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies or the New Jersey State Association of
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Chiefs of Police. Both accreditation agencies mandate stricter requirements for RIP and
use of force than those of the state. Therefore, any agency with requirements more
stringent than those of the state were excluded from analysis. This exclusion was needed
to maintain internal validity.
The decision to use one county was also a matter of practicality. I avoided
extensive travel throughout the state. Moreover, I anticipated that all OPRA requests
could be collected from the record custodians at each municipal agency within a
reasonable time period. The timeframe was focused on the 5 years before and after the
promulgation of the RIP directive in 2005. Prior to that, in 2000, the use of force policy
was revised and has remained unchanged to the present. In 2010, the state authorized the
use of electronic control devices (i.e., Tasers) as a force option. This authorization did not
alter the use of force policy, but it did represent a change in how officers could deliver
force. Therefore, studying the 5 years before and after the RIP provided a degree of
consistency to the force options available during the timeframe.
Caution should be used when generalizing these findings to the larger New Jersey
municipal police use of force population. Data for this study was collected from
municipal police agencies in only one county. The sample used for this analysis was
small and did not include data from the larger range of socioeconomic environments and
urban-rural classifications found in the state. Additionally, the collected data only
permitted a small number of variables to be analyzed. Still, the sample used here was a
subset of the New Jersey population, and the use of force reports used in the analysis
were chosen at random.
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The target population was all documented municipal police officer uses of force
between June 2000 and June 2010 in one New Jersey county. The population excluded
force used by police, sheriff’s officers, and corrections officers employed by county,
state, and federal agencies that conduct law enforcement activities within the county. All
reports indicating the use of force by municipal police officers were eligible for inclusion
into this study except those deemed unlawful or otherwise in violation of policy by an
agency or a court. These exclusions were necessary to ensure internal validity.
I considered using but excluded rational choice theory to frame the research
because certain assumptions were inappropriate. Rational choice assumes that actors
understand their preferences and make deliberate choices based on available information
and limitations to achieve the best outcomes given their aims (Wittek, Snijders, & Nee,
2013). This reasoning might help explain why officers take certain forceful actions with
only limited information, but it does not help explain officer preferences. Rational choice
theory must assume that officers want to use and escalate force, and desire the
administrative and judicial reviews that may result in punishment. No scholarly evidence
supports those assumptions. Force incidents are rare, and research has shown that officers
tend to use lesser force than necessary to accomplish their objectives (International
Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 2012; Terrill, 2001, 2005). Given the findings of
prior research, rational choice theory was excluded.
I also considered racial threat theory to frame this study but found its use limited.
Racial threat theory proposes that Whites use their power to implement state control over
minority populations (Blalock, 1967). However, given that New Jersey has never had a
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minority governor and the legislature historically has been predominantly White, the
theory cannot explain the existence of the RIP directive or other laws intended to prohibit
repressive state control of minority populations. This is not to suggest that the theory is
inappropriate in similar studies, as it has been used with mixed results to explain
disparities in police expenditures, arrests, sentencing, and capital punishment (Dollar,
2014). Still, the actions of officers that are inconsistent with the rules do not, by
themselves, suggest an outcome intended by the state.
Limitations
Several important limitations influenced the outcomes and treatment of the data.
The first limitation was that the New Jersey use of force reporting form was not intended
for this study but rather was intended to memorialize police uses of force. As a result,
many forms omitted variable responses and impacted the number of variables that could
be studied.
The second limitation was the version of the use of force form submitted by
officers. During this period, an older version of the report that remained in circulation did
not provide for reporting officer race and gender. Also, some agency leaders created their
own versions of this form that omitted officer variables. These forms were present in a
large portion of the sample and resulted in the exclusion of the officer race and officer
gender variables.
The third limitation involved reporting of force. The New Jersey use of force
policy requires that the reporting form be completed after each use of force (NJOAG,
2000). There is no reliable method by which to know if officers in the county were
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meticulous in their adherence to the rule. Therefore, I assumed that officers submitted all
necessary reports to their agencies.
The fourth limitation concerned the veracity of the information supplied on the
reporting form. This report is one method by which officers justify their actions. The
information contained on the report cannot be considered strictly objective (Atherley &
Hickman, 2014). However, officers would have been well served by providing honest
answers given that providing false information could have subjected the officer to
prosecution for false swearing or perjury (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:28-1; 2C:28-2). In the
absence of a method to ensure truthfulness, I assumed that all information provided by
the officers was completely truthful.
The fifth limitation involved how officers indicate the presence of unusual
conditions. Items in this category include intoxication and other conditions not defined.
Intoxication has a precise legal definition, but other conditions identified by the officers
do not have concrete or legal definitions. Officers provided information denoting mental
illness, emotional disturbances, and medical emergencies. They answered this category
based on the information gathered on the scene or through the lens of their training and
experience, frequently without the benefit of confirmation by forensic toxicology or
professional expert opinions. It is unknown if intoxication or other unusual circumstances
actually existed or their cause, so when indicated, I assumed that an unusual condition
existed.
The sixth limitation concerned my ability to elevate force use into the deadly
force category. As explained in the discussion of variables in Chapter 3, some instances
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of physical and mechanical force might actually be deadly force because they posed a
substantial risk of causing serious bodily injury or death. No reports provided evidence of
this enhanced danger. Therefore, absent such indication, I assumed that the reported level
of force was a proper representation of the force used.
The eighth limitation of this study was that the data did not indicate if the force
used was unlawful. Unlawful uses of force are not considered force per the policy; they
are considered crimes punishable under the criminal code. Because no reports were
marked as unlawful, I was unable to know if a report should be excluded from
examination. Therefore, all force reporting forms were considered documentation of
lawful uses of force.
The final limitation was that other significant variables were omitted. Important
items such as other agency policies influencing police officer actions and local crime
rates are not reflected on the collection instrument. Another important omitted variable
was inframarginality, or differential offending rates among races, which may have
affected the outcomes of this research, making it difficult to quantify racial bias (Ayers,
2002; Horn, McCluskey, & Mittelhammer, 2013; Simoiu, Corbett-Davies, & Goel,
2016). These problems are present in most force studies. These limitations must simply
be accepted as they cannot be changed until more advanced statistical methods have been
deemed reliable.
Undisclosed conflicts of interest may affect the independence, integrity, and
reporting of research findings. Therefore, I must disclose parts of my background that
may have influenced this study. I have been employed by municipal and county New
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Jersey police agencies. I retired as a police lieutenant, a position wherein I supervised and
managed officers in the patrol division, a group responsible for providing the uniformed
police services commonly associated with police work. At the end of my career, I was the
officer in charge of my department’s Internal Affairs and Professional Standards Unit,
which investigated allegations of officer misconduct. I have family members who were
police officers and some who remain police officers in New Jersey and other states.
Finally, I established a business entity in New Jersey that offers consulting services for
police misconduct litigation, agency development, and oversight. I endeavored to prevent
my own conflicts and biases from influencing this research by not collecting data from
my employing agencies and through proper design, analysis, and reporting.
Significance of the Study
This research contributed to knowledge within the discipline and advancing
practice and policy and promoting positive social change. Previous studies of force
within the criminal justice and policy disciplines were marred by difficulties in
conceptualization and operationalization of variables. The design of this research may aid
future force studies by providing conceptualizations and operationalizations of force
variables in a manner reflective of the policy paradigm. Because of these findings,
researchers may better assist practitioners and policymakers, and civilians and policy
makers can better communicate. This study demonstrated how civilians can monitor the
forceful actions of their police through the use of public records when data is not
regularly published in public forums. Also, the results of this study added a new
dimension to what is known about the effects of administrative rules to constrain police
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discretion. Scholarly research had not addressed the influence of administrative rules
prohibiting RIP where implicit biases may be unrecognized by officers and their
supervisors, and where these implicit biases affect official actions. This quantitative study
examined that scholarly gap.
Government officials, police practitioners, and civilians may find value in the
conceptualizations, methods, and results of this study. The findings can help frame the
policy paradigm encompassing the problem and reveal the effectiveness of the RIP
directive as a tool for police administrators to uphold the social contract and guarantee
the equal protection of all civilians during forceful encounters. Framing the problem
within the context of policy not only leads to a discovery of policy efficacy but also
provides civilians with insight into the details of how government structures and delimits
their lives and opportunities. This information can be harnessed for use in political
discourse to promote equal protection for all, restore trust, and advance public policy
choices reflective of community values.
Government officials, police practitioners, and civilians will benefit from this
study, as it demonstrates and corrects for an immanent confusion in policy terminology.
The use of force policies and force continuums confuse the differences between coercion
and force, preventing government officials and police practitioners from communicating
with the public without ambiguous jargon. While this issue is present in scholarly
literature and should be addressed in that realm, its presence in public policy serves to
disrupt honest evaluations of the RIP and force phenomena during policy debates and
public discourse and complicates civilian attempts to monitor police actions. This study
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offers a solution to align policy with common definitions of coercion and force to so that
all can communicate with a shared language while seeking to restore trust between the
police and civilians.
Police practitioners might be aided by the analytical methods used in this study.
The current findings serve as an example of the value of these methods in monitoring
officers for explicit and implicit racism as a part of an agency’s early intervention system.
These methods are not inaccessible to police administrators, and, if desired, can be
readily replicated in common spreadsheet programs without the need for expensive
proprietary software.
The implications for positive social change include the empowerment of the
public with the skills needed to monitor police uses of force through the use of publicly
available information. Moreover, citizens can better understand the nuances of the force
phenomenon that are contributing to the problem of trust between a large segment of
society and the police, and the public policy context in which that problem exists. The
dissertation and its findings provide granular detail of actual force incidents to facilitate
political discourse and promote evidence-based policy decisions intended to strengthen
trust between police and civilians.
Summary
The government and the people have a social contract requiring the government’s
equal treatment of its citizens. Recent events have called into question the government’s
ability to fulfill that obligation. Several highly publicized incidents involving police uses
of force on members of minority populations have coincided with a historic reduction in
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the public’s trust and confidence in the police to treat everyone equally (Jones, 2015; Pew
Research Center, 2014). The lack of trust in police damages the legitimacy and authority
of the police and government, and threatens the quality of life of all citizens, particularly
communities comprised of racial minority populations (Keita, 2014; Meares, Tyler, &
Gardener, 2014; Nix, Wolfe, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2014; Rahr & Rice, 2014; Richardson,
2015; White House, 2014). Still, the perceptions of widespread police abuse of racial
minorities is supported only with anecdotal but not empirical analysis (House Judiciary
Committee, 2016). Government officials and police practitioners must address the trust
problem using evidence-based steps supported by the best available research (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2014). The use of rules to prevent RIP offers one potential solution.
The extant literature has shown that administrative rules are effective at constraining
officer actions during critical incidents involving force (Anderson et al., 2002; Fyfe,
1978, 1979; Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). If rulemaking is effective at preventing RIP,
then the application of force should not disproportionately impact any racial category.
This study provided an evaluation of the ability of an administrative rule to prevent RIP
during officer uses of force.
Chapter 1 furnished a synopsis of this quantitative research. In answering the
research question regarding the influence of the RIP directive on officer uses of force, I
determined the nature and scope of police uses of force during a 10-year period in New
Jersey, the degree to which officers impartially dispense force, and the effectiveness of
the RIP directive as a tool to ensure equal protection of all civilians during incidents
involving force. Terms used in this study were made explicit, along with assumptions,
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limitations, and delimitations. The chapter further indicated the implications of the
findings to contribute to knowledge within the public policy and administration
discipline, advance evidence-based policing and policy practices, and promote positive
social change.
In Chapter 2, I will provide an in-depth literature review relating to the theoretical
foundation of this study, the extent of the force phenomenon, and the extant research on
the use of rules to constrain police discretion and use of force. I will identify those
entities capable of promulgating rules to New Jersey police agencies. I will also describe
the state of public policy regarding RIP and force in New Jersey.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Public confidence in the police continues to decline. Intense media coverage of
several extrajudicial killings of racial minority members and the protests that followed
have led to wide-ranging allegations about the police and intense public debate regarding
police reforms (Weitzer, 2015). These incidents correspond with public opinion polls
showing confidence in police at a historic low (Jones, 2015). Many people do not believe
police treat minority populations fairly (Pew Research Center, 2014). This problem
affects both the police and citizens as it undermines the legitimacy and authority of the
police (Meares et al., 2014; Nix et al., 2014; Rahr & Rice, 2014; Richardson, 2015), and
threatens the quality of life of all citizens, particularly communities comprised of racial
minority populations (Richardson, 2015; White House, 2014). Administrative rules offer
the ability for police agencies to structure and confine the behaviors of their officers in
ways that might restore the public trust (Davis, 1969, 1975; Walker & Archbold, 2014).
This study was designed to examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on
police uses of force to determine if it prevents officers from using race as a factor in their
decisions and if RIP is an effective tool for public administrators.
The opinion that police unfairly treat minorities contrasts with established public
policies in many states outlawing racial profiling. According to the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP, 2014), 30 states have laws prohibiting
racial profiling. Many of the states that have seen high-profile incidents of police
violence against racial minorities, such as California, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
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and Missouri, have such laws. SLBT helps explain when officers engage in RIP despite
existing rules. According to the theory, the SLB is someone often faced with the task of
fulfilling ambiguous policies within a rule-laden environment and treating all citizens
equally; at the same time, he or she must deliver government benefits and sanctions but
be responsive to the unique individual circumstances posed by those with whom the
bureaucrat must interact (Lipsky, 2010). Since it is impossible to treat everyone the same
while attending to special circumstances, these workers use the discretion afforded to
their positions to manage their environment by developing unsanctioned coping
mechanisms, sometimes in conflict with existing rules (Lipsky, 2010). These mechanisms
typically involve the differentiation of clients, and without sufficient supervision, become
de facto public policy (Davis, 1969, 1975; Lipsky, 2010).
Lipsky (2010) has demonstrated that police officers are such street-level
bureaucrats who enjoy a wide degree of discretion in their duties, but their performance is
governed by rules (Davis, 1969, 1975; White, 2001). The use of rules to constrain police
behavior has been found effective in reducing incidents of deadly force, non-deadly
force, and vehicle pursuits (Becknell, Larry Mays, & Giever, 1999; Crew, Kessler, &
Fridell, 1995; Fyfe, 1978, 1979; Terrill & Paoline; 2016; Walker, 1993; White, 2000,
2001, 2003). Officers who do not follow the rules engage in misconduct. The extent to
which such misconduct occurs is unknown, but studies have shown that most officers
follow the rules (Harris, 2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Walker, 2001b). Those
officers who defy rules and established public policy regarding RIP influence the public’s
negative opinion that police officers unfairly treat minority populations.
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As a matter of public policy, New Jersey, the first state in the nation to create a
policy outlawing RIP, rejects racial discrimination (NJOAG, 2005b). It also one of the
few states that treat RIP as a crime punishable by a mandatory prison sentence of no less
than 5 years (see NAACP, 2014). The policy is clear and only one among many created
by several layers of government designed to influence policing in the state. Still, the
extant literature provides no indication that a rule prohibiting RIP influences police
behavior, the gap addressed in this study.
New Jersey does not suffer from the same data collection, conceptualization, or
operationalization difficulties present in the media, the federal government, and scholarly
analyses of police force usage. Researchers have had problems gathering data and faced
inconsistent definitions and measurements (see Comey, 2015; Fryer, 2016; Klahm IV &
Tillyer, 2010; Terrill & Paoline III, 2012; Walker, 2003; Withrow & Williams, 2015).
Researchers have also used benchmarks fraught with limitations (see Walker, 2003;
Withrow & Williams, 2015). Although New Jersey has a statewide policy overcoming
most of these difficulties, the state has not overcome the benchmark obstacle. Like other
assessments, external benchmarks leave room for error, such as those created by failures
to accurately capture local demographics and populations, rates of police exposure, and
differential offending rates (Ayers, 2002; Horn et al., 2013; Simoiu et al., 2016; Withrow
& Williams, 2015). Internal benchmarking overcomes the disadvantages of external
benchmarking because it is an outcomes-based assessment that compares data, such as
arrests and summonses, from similarly situated units exposed to the similar contextual
environments operating under similar rules. The data contained in use of force reports
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allows for internal benchmark comparisons, but there is no instruction or mechanism
requiring this type of analysis.
Unlike a simple count of force use frequency, New Jersey requires data collection
on force usage that includes the presence of several variables present in the extant
research. Over the past several decades, scholars have discovered that many variables
may influence police uses of force. This literature review will explore the findings of
many of these studies and demonstrate their connection to my research. Still, these
studies have suffered from problems associated with conceptualization and
operationalization, making it difficult to compare the findings across the various research
(Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010). The variables found to influence officer
behavior can be categorized into suspect, encounter, officer, neighborhood, and
organizational characteristics. Bolger (2014) suggested certain suspect and encounter
characteristics significantly influence force use, such as the seriousness of the offense and
resistance. The reporting mechanism used in New Jersey collects many of the studied
variables and some of those found to be most influential in the use of force. To the extent
possible, this study controlled for these variables to determine the influence of the RIP
directive on officer uses of force.
In this chapter, I will review information significant as a background for this
study. I begin by explaining my literature collection strategy followed by a description of
the theoretical framework. Finally, I provide a literature review of concepts involved in
administrative rules, a description of the police non- and deadly force phenomenon, the
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structure of administrative control in the New Jersey policing enterprise, rules affecting
police operations, and numerous officer use-of-force decision-making variables.
Literature Search Strategy
To find literature related to this study, multiple Boolean search terms were created
from a combination of words and phrases, including accountability, decision making,
discretion, force, forceful encounters, police, police-citizen encounters, street-level
bureaucrat, use of force, use of violence, and working rules. These terms were then used
to gather peer-reviewed literature from the ProQuest Criminal Justice Periodicals Index,
Political Science Complete, Business Source Complete, and SAGE Premier for the period
between January 1, 1996, to April 31, 2017. I added literature that was known to be
related to the study but gathered during my career in policing. This effort created a
starting set of literature upon which a snowball method, guided by Wohlin (2014), was
used to find additional literature. A subsequent Google Scholar search was conducted
using the same parameters in search of literature that may not have been located followed
by another snowball iteration. I gave greater attention to peer-reviewed articles and other
scholarly sources within the last 10 years, particularly those within 5 years, involving
studies of U.S. police officers. The scope of the literature spanned peer-reviewed articles,
dissertations and theses, books, reports of professional organizations, governmentpublished documents, and seminal literature related to the topics.
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Theoretical Foundation
The Street-Level Bureaucrat
Lower-level government employees are instruments of public policy affecting the
lives of those served. Lipsky (2010) named those employees street-level bureaucrats
(SLBs). They work in a realm distinguished by a high degree of uncertainty caused by
societal difficulties and the need to make frequent or rapid decisions (Lipsky, 2010).
SLBs, playing an important role in society through their direct contact with citizens,
deliver government benefits and sanctions that structure and delimit the lives and
opportunities of those citizens (Lipsky, 2010). SLBs wield considerable discretion in the
day-to-day execution of public programs, meaning that they choose from among various
courses of action based on their judgment (Worden, Harris, & McClean, 2014). Their
individual actions are the extension of the state’s influence and control over its citizens
and in aggregate embody public policy (Lipsky, 2010).
Street-level bureaucrats use discretion to overcome the combination of agency
rules, unclear policies, insufficient resources, and the flood of public demands that
complicate policy implementation. Facing the contradiction of following programmatic
agency routines and rules designed to provide equal treatment for all clients, SLBs must
respond to unique and individual circumstances (Lipsky, 2010). Their work of fulfilling
an unlimited public demand is made more difficult by limited resources and equivocal
objectives (Lipsky, 2010; Matland, 1995). SLBs use discretion to develop coping
mechanisms filling the gap between utopian performance and reality (Lipsky, 2010;
Matland, 1995). The result is that SLBs do for some what they cannot do for everyone by
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rationing and restricting services through the differentiation of clients (Lipsky, 2010).
Those deemed deserving are given added attention while the undeserving receive
imposing degrees of burden associated with their receipt of rights and benefits (Lipsky,
2010). These mechanisms are rarely approved by their agencies but are often necessary to
achieve some degree of agency success.
The cumulative effect of street-level decisions made on the basis of coping
mechanisms can alter the intended policy direction and could become destructive.
Dunsire (1990) called this changed direction the implementation gap, which differentiates
intended policy outcomes from the actual positive and negative effects caused by civil
servant behaviors. This gap has also been referred to it as an implementation deficit and
incongruent implementation (Hupe, Hill, & Namgia, 2014). Lipsky (2010) focused most
on the negative outcomes caused by coping mechanisms finding that they might
undermine citizens’ expectations of equal treatment. Unsanctioned mechanisms might be
constructed with elements of stereotypes, prejudice, and racism normally present within
the broader context of society capable of causing harm to many people. These coping
mechanisms can lead to claims of reduced care and favoritism (Lipsky, 2010). The use of
unsanctioned coping mechanisms provides an explanation for instances of
institutionalized prejudice contradicting published policy, such as in instances where
police officers have used race as a factor in drawing inferences or conclusions about a
person’s involvement in criminal activity.
The potential pitfalls of coping mechanisms lead to arguments to cease all SLB
discretion, but such arguments fail to account for public desires (Lipsky, 2010). Public
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policy cannot create algorithms for programmed decisions that provide both impartiality
and flexibility (Lipsky, 2010). SLBs are afforded discretion in part because society does
not want the inflexible application of standards without an ability to show compassion
and pliability in unique situations (Lipsky, 2010). The result is that SLBs are expected to
professionally exercise discretion within their fields.
Lipsky (2010) explained that the ability of SLBs to exercise discretion is not
unrestrained by rules or directives, but such efforts achieve limited success. This was a
weakness in his study, as Lipsky offered only the typical suggestions to control
discretion, such as holding SLBs accountable for agency objectives, reducing discretion,
and constraining alternatives through rules, audits, and sanctions. The intended effect of
these measures is to standardize behavior, generate employee awareness of management
oversight, and direct workers’ efforts (Lipsky, 2010). Agency policies supported by
significant sanctions help achieve desired behaviors. However, Lipsky acknowledged that
rules may impede supervision. If rules become too voluminous or contradictory,
management will be compelled to engage in selective enforcement.
Street-level bureaucrats may resist controls over their discretion because their
priorities differ from their managers. Specifically, SLBs are interested in processing their
work in a manner consistent with their preferences, minimizing real dangers and
discomforts, and maximizing income and personal gratification (Lipsky, 2010).
Managers, on the other hand, are interested in achieving agency goals and objectives.
When supervision is minimal, evaluation of SLBs becomes difficult as supervisors are
unable to directly observe the intangible factors leading to SLB decisions (Lipsky, 2010).
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Additionally, auditing is complicated when SLBs complete paperwork in a way that
guards against later adverse inspection (Lipsky, 2010). SLBs can capitalize on
weaknesses inherent with insufficient supervision to maintain control of their work
despite the controls applied by management.
Previous Applications of SLBT
SLBT has been successfully applied across multiple dimensions of the social
sciences, but the area most similar to this study are those examining policy
implementation and the degree to which outcomes are based on race (Keiser, 2010;
Marschall, Rigby, & Jenkins, 2011; Morrell & Currie, 2015; Tummers & Rocco, 2015).
Three recent studies in the areas of welfare, election administration, and housing involved
policy implementation where outcomes are assessed based on the race of the recipient.
Ernst, Nguyen, and Taylor (2013) used SLBT to frame their qualitative
examination of the quality of service of all Community Services Offices in Washington
state to determine if service differed based on race. Citizens claim their social rights
through these offices (Hasenfeld, Rafferty, & Zald, 1987). Ernst et al. found that White
men had the most positive interactions with staff in these offices while Black women had
the worst. In the face-to-face interactions, the White investigator consistently had more
positive interactions and received more information than the other investigators,
particularly more than the Black investigator. The results indicate a degree of
institutionalized racism at the hands of SLBs, contrary to stated policy.
White, Nathan, and Faller (2015) used SLBT for their quantitative experiment
intended to measure U.S. local election administrators’ email responses to constituents of
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different ethnicities. The study involved two emails from putative White and Hispanic
sounding names. The email from the White name asked a less politicized question, while
the email from the Hispanic name asked for information about voter ID laws. The authors
discovered that Hispanics were less likely to receive accurate responses and less likely to
receive informative responses than non-Latino emailers. While these election officials are
responsible for providing a fair and voter-friendly atmosphere, the authors found that the
election officials showed bias against Hispanics.
Einstein and Glick (2016) used SLBT in their quantitative experiment to gauge
racial bias in affordable housing programs in large metropolitan and micropolitan areas.
Similar to White et al. (2015), the authors sent emails asking how to apply for public
housing. They found that response rates for Hispanics were significantly lower than those
of White and Blacks. They also discovered that Hispanics also received less friendly
replies. The results of this study indicate that SLBs from this sample population do
engage in behavior conflicting with anti-discrimination
The previous research has found that public officials sometimes do engage in
racially motivated behaviors that create a de facto policy in conflict with established
public policy. The actions of the studied officials would have significantly structured and
delimited the lives and opportunities of those they served. These studies serve as
examples of the validity for the use of SLBT in research examining racial disparities that
may occur during policy implementation
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Rationale for Use of Street-Level Bureaucrats Theory
I examined the effect of the New Jersey RIP directive on officer decisions to use
force across one county. The use of SLBT is appropriate as Lipsky (2010) wrote, police
officers are SLBs. They operate in an uncertain environment, regularly without the
benefit of complete information upon which to make decisions, generally with copious
rules but without direct supervision, sometimes acting in opposition to those rules while
trying to serve ambiguous objectives. Officers frequently interact with citizens and use
discretion to deliver government benefits and sanctions that may have far-reaching
effects on the lives of the citizens, their families, and the community (Brooks, 2015;
Sekhon, 2011; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Among their discretionary tools is the
absolute authority and responsibility to use of both non- and deadly force (Brooks, 2015;
Sekhon, 2011; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Their use of deadly force is the ultimate
extension of the state’s influence and control over its citizens. There is long history in the
United States of government sanctioned racial disparities involving a wide array of
government benefits and sanctions, especially those offered by police (Cooper, 2015;
IACP, 2016; Uchida, 2015). Recent highly publicized deaths of Black men at the hand of
police have been held as evidence that police use more force, especially deadly force, on
minorities (Chaney & Robertson, 2015). Where officer uses of force show racially
disparate impact on citizens, SLBT would help explain that policy implementation gap.
Support for the use of SLBT in the current research can be drawn from Davis
(1969, 1975). In his study of discretion in the criminal justice system, Davis (1969) found
that the realm of statutes and judge-made law were overdeveloped, while those with the
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greatest exercises of discretion were underdeveloped, such as administrative, police, and
prosecutorial justice. Davis’s (1975) qualitative study of the administrative processes of
the Chicago Police Department found that local police operations were guided by the
false pretense that all laws are enforced by officers while the reality demonstrated that
there were insufficient resources to achieve that goal. Instead, officers regularly enforced
some laws, almost never enforced others, and still other laws were enforced based on the
attitudes of the officer, with those decisions sometimes based on the offending person or
occasion. Davis (1975) concluded that much of the police department’s enforcement
policy is determined by the low-level officers, who did so without the benefit of legal
advisers, and whose personal enforcement policies usually differed from department
policies and that of other officers. Davis (1975) asserted that the discretionary actions of
officers led to the majority of claims involving injustice.
Davis (1975) and Lipsky (2010) were similar in their belief that discretion is
necessary for the work of SLBs, but the authors differed in their beliefs regarding its
control. Unlike Lipsky, Davis proffered the elimination of unnecessary discretion while
controlling necessary discretion. Unfortunately, Davis did not expand on what could be
considered necessary discretion, perhaps a deliberate choice. He proposed a revolutionary
method to determine local policing priorities that would supply greater opportunity for
equal protection under the law while leaving available the individualized application of
law in unique circumstances. Davis’s administrative rulemaking proposal made his study
a key work of scholarship in what is now known as democratic policing (Friedman &
Ponomarenko, 2015). Still, Davis’s idea of communities and police administrators

37
collaborating to establish police priorities has not been widely accepted, but his
recommendations for the construction of administrative rules is widely used.
The substance of a rule was a matter a special attention as it would be the tool to
control officer behavior. Officer behavior was to be confined through the use of a written
policy detailing what can and cannot be done, structured by specifying factors the officer
should consider when making a decision, and checked through the review of incident
reports (Davis, 1975; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Later research would show that officers
ranking higher than the immediate supervisor should review these reports because the
immediate supervisor was frequently fulfilling a supportive role in protecting subordinate
officers from unfair discipline (U.S. DOJ, 2003). The information contained within the
rule itself was the vehicle by which the policy would be implemented.
New Jersey police officers have the authority and responsibility to use non- and
deadly force when administering public policy. The RIP and use of force directives
follow the Davis (1969, 1975) rule model by confining, structuring, and checking officer
behavior to prevent unlawful uses of force. If racial disparities are found in police uses of
force, SLBT serves as a framework to understand how they might have occurred.
Extent of the Force Phenomenon
The extent to which police officers use force is not known. According to Walker
and Archbold (2014), only 1–2% of citizen-police encounters result in the use of force.
Hickman, Piquero, and Garner (2008) concluded that, nationally, only 1.7% of all police
contacts result in some kind of force. Others have described police uses of force as a
small percentage of police-citizen encounters or simply rare (Alpert & Dunham, 2004;

38
IACP, 2012; Pollock & Reynolds, 2015; Terrill, 2001, 2003, 2005). Force is used in 15–
20% of arrests (Smith et al., 2010). Still, when force is used, lower levels of force are
more commonly applied (Garner, Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002; Lawton, 2007; Terrill &
Mastrofski, 2002). Despite these assurances, data collection in this arena has remained a
challenge.
Problems With Data Collection
The limitations for collecting data to analyze the extent of police uses of force
against citizens on a national scale include (a) a lack of a common definition of force; (b)
widely varying perspectives and perceptions of force within and among the police and
civilian communities; (c) the absence of mandatory reporting mechanisms to collect such
data; and (d) greater attention by scholars and the media on deadly force over non-deadly
force, with few studies examining both.
The lack of a commonly accepted definition of police use of force makes an
assessment of the phenomenon difficult. Scholars identified this dilemma for the
purposes of research (Adams, 1995, 2015; Bittner, 1970; Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010).
Garner, Schade, Hepburn, and Buchanan (1995) helped researchers achieve a common
scholarly definition when they applied the National Academy of Sciences definition of
violence to their research. In their study, force was described as “behaviors by individuals
that intentionally threaten, attempt, or inflict physical harm on others” (p. 152). Still,
subsequent research has suffered from a disjuncture between conceptualizations of force
and operationalization of the construct leaving the definition among most studies illdefined and operationalization inconsistent across studies (Klahm IV, Frank, &
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Liederbach, 2014). On a national scale, the criminal justice system has not had a similar
level of agreement as police agencies have no commonly accepted definition of force
(Walker & Archbold, 2014, p. 79), except perhaps that of deadly force (Adams, 2015).
An important limitation to understanding the extent of the force phenomenon is
the lack of an effective mechanism to collect data. In the months that followed several
publicized incidents, James Comey (2015), director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, acknowledged that even he had difficulty measuring the frequency of
deadly force using the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) because reporting by police
agencies is voluntary, and few agencies submit data. Comey admitted that the data that
have been collected by the FBI is incomplete and unreliable. Additionally, the UCR is of
no value in measuring non-deadly force incidents because such reporting is not collected
even on a voluntary basis. The newer National Incident-Based Reporting System is also a
flawed measure in that regard. The Bureau of Justice Statistics data from the ArrestRelated Death component of the Death in Custody Reporting Program is flawed because
the methodology has been demonstrated to capture only 72% of the estimated reportable
deaths (Banks & Planty, 2015). Included among reportable deaths are those where
someone died in the presence of a police officer but not in the officer’s custody, and
those not directly related to police action or negligence, such as deaths caused by
intoxication, suicide, and natural causes (U.S. DOJ, 2012).
Despite the criminal justice measurement failures presented above, official
government records may still provide insight into the phenomenon. Public health records
have been used to measure the deadly force phenomenon. Krieger, Kiang, Chen, and
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Waterman (2015) used public health records to calculate deaths caused by legal
intervention. The term legal intervention was simply defined as “deaths due to law
enforcement actions” without any further clarification, so it is unclear what categories of
people are included in law enforcement or what actions constitute legal intervention (p.
1). Analyzing national mortality data from 1960-2010, Krieger et al. found 15,699
incidents of death attributed to legal intervention, excluding lawful executions. Of those,
63.3% involved men between the ages of 15–34, where Whites accounted for 55.3% and
Blacks for 42.3%. The authors note limitations to publicly available national mortality
data, specifically the likely underreporting of police killings, a lack of real-time data
reporting, and the aggregation of data to the county level. These gaps cannot be filled by
the National Violent Death Reporting System because that system only receives data
from 32 states (Barber et al., 2016; Krieger et al., 2015). Krieger et al. recommended
making all law-enforcement-related deaths a reportable health condition to improve
future knowledge and accountability of the phenomenon. Doing so would require an
administrative rule by public health agencies and would serve as an independent method
of accountability as it would exist outside law enforcement enterprises.
While the government has yet to develop a system to accurately collect data on
police deadly force incidents, other organizations of varying degrees of reliability have
started to fill the data void. Operation Ghetto Storm (OGS) has not put forth a new
analysis of extrajudicial killings by police since 2014, but it is still active in providing
social commentary. In 2012, OGS published a report claiming that a Black person is
killed by police every 28 hours but might be closer to every 24 hours (Eisen, 2014). This
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analysis showed a “War against Black people” evidenced by the “[government’s] practice
of executing Black people without pretense of a trial, jury, or judge [and which] is an
integral part of the government’s current overall strategy of containing the Black
community in a state of perpetual colonial subjugation and exploitation” (Eisen, 2014, p.
1, 4). This figure was used by individuals with scholarly backgrounds in the mainstream
and peripheral media sources and by protest groups calling for greater police
accountability to indicate the frequency with which police kill Black people (Carruthers,
2014; Hamm, 2016; Hill, 2014; A. Hudson, 2013).
Although the OGS figure has been used in the media to indicate the extent of
police killings, Eisen (2014) intended the report to be an examination of extrajudicial
killings believed to be attributed to a racist government and its policies through statesanctioned actors. These actors include police officers, private security guards, and
vigilantes. The author’s conceptualization of extrajudicial killing by police is any death
coinciding with contact by someone or something subjectively perceived to be related to
the police. Extrajudicial killing by police is operationalized by measuring intentional and
unintentional death at the hands of state-sanctioned actors, including those deaths caused
by traffic accidents, accidental firearm discharges, and unsecured weapons used by
children. The analysis provided by the author was meant neither to serve as an evaluation
of only sworn police officers employed by police agencies nor an indication of the
frequency with which they use deadly force during their official duties. Nonetheless,
without reliable data from the government, sources such as this have been held by many
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as a national estimate of extrajudicial killings by sworn police officers (Carruthers, 2014;
Hamm, 2016; Hill, 2014; A. Hudson, 2013).
Other sources have emerged to fill the gap in government data claiming to count
police killings. The sources have used data obtained through researchers, public records,
and crowd-sourcing. For 2016, among the numerous organizations claiming to count
deaths attributed to police, the following organizations reported the following deaths,
Copcrisis.com–1,152; Fatalencounters.org–1,568; and Killedbypolice.net–1,162. These
websites share data and include deaths through unintentional and negligent means (e.g.,
traffic accidents) and deaths in custodial detention (e.g., jails and prisons). None of the
websites claim to measure police use of deadly force, but like the OGS report, there is a
broad conceptualization and operationalization of killing by police which is quite
different from deaths attributed to the intentional use of deadly force by a sworn police
acting under the color of law. While the information provided by these websites is
important and may have a significant public policy and risk management applications, the
validity of any claim to measure uses of deadly force by police officers during their
official duties is tenuous without disaggregating the data. Use of these numbers with the
purpose to represent the frequency of duty-related deadly force used by police is
inaccurate.
Larger mainstream media organizations have also created databases and provided
analysis on police uses of deadly force. The Guardian’s “The Counted” series tracks the
number of people killed by police, including negligent deaths, while The Washington
Post counts police fatal shootings. These sites collect their data using resources similar to

43
those previously mentioned including crowd-sourcing, but The Guardian suffers from the
conceptualization and operationalization flaws found on those websites, and the
journalists make no attempt to connect the incident to official duties. In contrast, The
Washington Post calculates all police shootings including those resulting from accidental
discharges but not those believed to be murder by off-duty officers. It does not capture
deaths attributed to force actions not related to firearms. It is unclear if the data contain
instances where a police officer’s firearm was used by another person. For 2016, The
Guardian reported 1,093 (53% White, 24% Black, 17% Hispanic, 2% Asian/Pacific
Islander, 2% Native American, and 2% unknown) police-related deaths and The
Washington Post reported 963 (48% White, 24% Black, 17% Hispanic, 4% other, and 7%
unknown) police shooting fatalities (Guardian, 2016; Washington Post, 2016). These
findings are remarkable but there is an important difference between the two sets of data.
I was curious to see how the inclusion of data from deaths attributed to police but
not caused by the intentional use of deadly force by police officers during the execution
of public duties affected the overall findings. I reviewed the 2016 New Jersey cases from
the Guardian and the Washington Post but found only a small disparity. A single case,
equating to seven percent of all deaths, did not involve officers acting under the color or
their official duties. This case involved an alleged murder committed by an off-duty
police officer. However, the 2015 data provided a better example of how including deaths
attributed to other than official duties obscures the force phenomena. For 2015, the
Guardian indicated that New Jersey police officers killed 23 people (39% White, 39%
Black, 3% Hispanic, 4% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 4% unknown) while The Washington
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Post showed 15 deaths (47% White, 27% Black, 20% Hispanic, and 7% unknown)
attributed to police shootings (Guardian, 2015; Washington Post, 2015). All deaths
captured by The Washington Post were captured by the Guardian. Among the
Guardian’s reported deaths were two traffic accidents involving an on-duty police
officer, one traffic accident involving an off-duty police officer, one murder involving an
off-duty corrections officer, and one murder by an off-duty police officer. These five
deaths in the Guardian’s 2015 reporting fail to provide a link between sworn police
officers fulfilling their public duties and the intentional use of deadly force, or roughly
21% of the 2015 reported deaths in New Jersey. Such disparity reveals an urgent need to
create a consistent conceptualization and operationalization of force in order to separate
that construct from other data purported to be police killings.
Two online newspapers have offered methods for readers to examine variables
present in scholarly research. The data collected by The Guardian showing the number of
police killings can be filtered into categories, such as gender, race, age, and the presence
of a weapon. The data can be further filtered by state and classification of death, such as
gunshot or struck by a vehicle. Police shooting data from the Washington Post can be
further subdivided into two additional categories, signs of mental illness and threat level
but cannot filter on a classification of death. Most of the variables collected by these two
news organizations have been extensively examined in scholarly research. Notably,
absent from their list of variables is a level of the suspect’s resistance, described later in
this chapter, which has been found to be a significant influence on force outcomes.
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The measurement of the deadly force phenomenon is difficult and contentious but
the measurement non-deadly force is virtually absent but equally controversial. Fryer
(2016) explained that data on non-deadly force is nearly non-existent because many
agencies simply do not collect the data or simply let it exist within narrative police
reports where it is difficult to extract. One option for overcoming the data collection
problem from police agencies is by analyzing the Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS)
available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2011). This survey is collected every 3
years as a supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey using a sample of
people aged 16 and older who answer questions related to any type of police contact
within the previous 12 months (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). In analyzing the data
from 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011, Hyland, Langton, and Davis (2015) found an annual
average of 715,500 non-deadly force incidents, including all threats of force by an
officer, as well as instances where force was actually used. The PPCS has several
disadvantages: (a) data cannot be disaggregated to smaller geographic areas, (b) there is
an absence of contextual information, (c) jailed individuals and those under 16 years of
age are omitted, and (d) the data only provide the civilian interpretations of the encounter
(Fryer, 2016; Hyland et al., 2015). Additionally, the PCS does not draw distinctions
between coercive threats and actual force. While the PPCS provides an estimate of the
extent of non-deadly force, that estimate may be misleading due to its loose
conceptualization and operationalization of non-deadly force and its several
disadvantages.
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The prior discussion reflects remarkable problems in collecting data on both nonand deadly force. As I have shown, national efforts to gauge the frequency of deadly
force data have been fragmentary and confusing at best, and efforts to gauge non-deadly
force is nearly nonexistent. As will be described in more detail later, the policies of the
State of New Jersey overcome these data collection problems and makes force use by
police quantifiable on several levels. This study was the first to collect data on both types
of force to assess the influence of public policy using a conceptualization and
operationalization of force that is consistent between the researcher and the officers
carrying out public policy.
Problems Analyzing Collected Data
The extent of the national use of force phenomenon and questions of racial
implications are currently a matter of best-educated guesses. Efforts to calculate the
degree of racial profiling in any act of police discretion is complicated by the lack of a
method for measuring racial and ethnic proportions (Alpert, Smith, & Dunham, 2004;
Ramirez, McDevitt, & Farrell, 2000; Sekhon, in press; Withrow & Williams, 2015).
Many researchers have attempted to gauge racial profiling in policing, with principal
strategies involving analyses of traffic stops (Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007; Walker,
2001a, 2003). Two common methods from these studies can be used to analyze force data
for evidence of RIP, external and internal benchmarking.
External benchmarking compares outside data to collected data. The most
frequently used external benchmark to gauge racial disparities is the residential
population of the police jurisdiction (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Withrow & Williams,
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2015). Researchers have compared the frequency of stops, searches, arrests, and force in
relation to the proportion of racial groups in the local residential population (Bejarano,
2001; Gelman et al., 2007; Goff, Lloyd, Geller, Raphael, & Glaser, 2016; Penn, 2006;
Smith & Petrocelli, 2001; Verniero & Zoubek, 1999; Zingraff et al., 2000). Also, census
data are frequently the benchmark provided in news analysis (see Craven, 2016; Sager,
2016; Swain, Laughland, Lartey, & McCarthy, 2015), although such research has been
criticized for failing to account for transient populations, differential rates of exposure to
police, differential rates of offending, and undocumented residents (Ayers, 2002; Cox,
Pease, Miller, & Tyson, 2001; Horn et al., 2013; Simoiu, Corbett-Davies, & Goel, 2016;
Walker, 2001a; Withrow & Williams, 2015; Zingraff et al., 2000). These failings may
result in findings lacking in validity and which may influence the perceptions that police
unfairly treat racial minorities. As a result of these difficulties, research has begun to shift
toward internal benchmarking methods (Tillyer & Engel, 2010).
Internal benchmarking compares collected data from one unit of measure to
similarly situated other units of measure within the study. The underlying assumption of
internal benchmarking in policing is that similarly situated officers will perform similarly
because they are exposed to the same contextual environment (Walker, 2003; Withrow &
Williams, 2015). Those who differ from the others are considered anomalies requiring
additional attention. This type of research is an outcomes-based assessment that analyzes
differences in police performance among officers (e.g., warnings, summonses, searches,
and arrests). Many police agencies have begun to use this type of benchmarking as part of
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an internal affairs early intervention system to monitor for problem officers, such as the
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati police departments (Walker, 2003).
Internal benchmarking has several advantages over external benchmarking but
still has important limitations. Internal benchmarking does not introduce measurement
error, such as those relating to transient populations; accounts for differential rates of
exposure to police; and is effective at identifying officers who behave differently from
others (Withrow & Williams, 2015). However, internal benchmarking suffers from two
failings. First, it is difficult to operationalize similarly situated officers, as officers may be
tasked to handle service calls outside their assignment or temporarily redeployed to
different assignments. Second, internal benchmarking is unable to identify misconduct,
such as racial profiling, if the conduct is rampant or systemic.
Internal benchmarking does not lend itself to the creation of a simple headline
figure, but rather involves constant qualitative comparison among calculated statistics.
Evaluators are free to utilize a broad degree of latitude in using factors for comparison.
Policing is generally considered a local issue, a thought supported by a recent study that
noted “precincts matter,” and such small units of measurement are important to data
analysis for RIP (Fryer, 2016, p. 17; Pollock, Oliver, & Menerd, 2012; Ridgeway &
MacDonald, 2013). Internal benchmarking offers promise in assessing the propensity of
racial profiling and is useful in nuanced reviews of force by tailoring the analysis to local
needs. By reviewing contextual details, evaluators can better decide the tactical, legal,
and moral appropriateness of force use and make policy changes appropriate for local
needs.
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Rule Makers
The makeup of the U.S. government provides many layers of rule makers. Each
branch of government at each level of government can create administrative rules that
police agencies must follow (Skogan & Meares, 2004). Even the demands of insurance
agencies cause rules that must be followed by police agencies (Rappaport, 2016). In this
section, I address the five rule makers most influential to this study.
The Judicial System
The judicial system provides administrative rules that govern many police
activities. Through federal, state, and local court decisions, also known as case law,
police actions are deemed legal and proper or improper and the decision is binding upon
all agencies within the courts’ jurisdiction. For the purpose of this study, these decisions
are considered rules because agencies must react to the decisions by ensuring all future
officer actions conform with the decision. The decisions of the court are based on broad
legal concepts often focused on specific officer behaviors. Sometimes these rulings help
make matters clear and sometimes they do not.
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) established the baseline
standards used to guide police officer uses of force in the nation through case law in
Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor (1989) and have been adopted in full
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. SCOTUS recognized that officers are “… often forced
to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation” (Graham
v. Connor, 1989, p. 3). The Court did not go as far as to require officers’ judgements to
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be right, but it did require that officers use objectively reasonable force given the totality
of the circumstances. The Court did not stop there, it further offered a method by which
to determine if force used was excessive.
Garner and Graham began the objective reasonableness standard by which the
actions of officers were to be judged in official legal proceedings. The Court rejected the
notion that claims of excessive force could be evaluated by a single generic standard.
Instead, the force used must be evaluated under a reasonableness standard requiring a “…
careful balancing of " `the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests' " against the countervailing governmental interests at stake”
(United States v. Place as cited in Graham v. Connor, 1989, p. 2). In the course of
balancing the intrusion against government interests, one must consider severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight
(Graham v. Connor, 1989). Such an evaluation must consider the force used by an officer
“… from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight [and] without regard to their underlying intent or motivation”
(Graham v. Connor, 1989, p. 3). Some have argued that the standard is not very
objective. Terrill and Paoline (2016) asserted that the objective reasonableness standard
provides an ambiguous threshold. The ambiguity results from the subjective nature of the
word reasonable. Black’s Law Dictionary defines reasonable as “agreeable to reason;
just; proper, [or] ordinary or usual” (Law dictionary, n.d.-a). Other sources provide
similar and equally arguable definitions. The required reliance on personal opinions
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makes it difficult to distinguish reasonable force from excessive force (Alpert & Smith,
1994). While reasonableness is much more easily deduced when life-threatening dangers
clearly exist, it is more difficult to conclude when they clearly do not. Claims that the
objective reasonableness standard is equivocal are justified. However, these claims
support the Supreme Court’s notion that a single generic standard cannot be used to
evaluate officer uses of force. Each individual act of force must be evaluated on its own
merits. Within the court system, allegations of excessive force are reviewed in state
criminal and tort litigation or federal criminal suites under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and civil suits
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The findings of these cases further develop the reasonableness
standard and inform officers of the actions that might be deemed excessive in similar
circumstances.
The objective reasonableness standard lends itself to differences in perceptions
between the public and police and might be one cause of the public’s diminished trust in
the police. The objective reasonableness standard offered by the Court is very different
from the standards offered by many in the popular media and crowdsourced accounting
mechanisms described earlier. What the courts consider reasonable may be deemed
excessive by a citizen, force which is often referred to as lawful but awful. To complicate
matters, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the objective reasonableness
standard removes any need to consider the subjective officer intentions, such as racially
biased motivations (Scott v. United States, 1978; United States v. Robinson, 1973; Whren
v. United States, 1996). As long as the totality of the circumstances presents an
objectively reasonable reason to use force, subjective motivations are unimportant. Chin
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and Vernon (2015) argued that the standard endorses racial discrimination. Cooper
(2015) found this fact especially troubling because of the potential it gives to raciallybiased officers to commit murder without the fear of being held accountable. E. J. Miller
(2015) argued the individualized focus of the objectively reasonable standard would not
capture larger issues related to distributive justice. While the standard is the strict legal
threshold to hold officers accountable for their actions, there are concerns by some that
the threshold is too high and too deferential to police.
U.S. Department of Justice
For the purpose of this study, among the greatest influences on New Jersey police
policies was the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. DOJ. That division sued the State of
New Jersey under the authority of 42 USC § 14141. This code allows the U.S. Attorney
General (USAG) to sue police agencies when there is a reason to believe that officers are
engaged in a pattern or practice of depriving people of their constitutional rights with the
purpose to bring about organizational reforms that establish standards of accountability to
prevent future occurrences (Walker & MacDonald, 2008).
In 1999, the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) entered into a Consent Decree with
the USAG that later became a cornerstone for the New Jersey RIP policy. The decree
settled the pattern or practice lawsuit alleging that the NJSP failed to adopt and
implement management practices to control officer discretion by allowing officers to
target minority drivers and passengers for enforcement actions. Among the many parts of
the agreement were stipulations that (a) officers of the NJSP would not be allowed to use
race or ethnicity in decisions to conduct traffic stops or conduct post-stop action; (b)
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NJSP officers would document the race, ethnicity, gender, the reasons for all traffic stops
and all post-stop actions; (c) NJSP supervisors would review officer traffic stop reports
and mobile video recordings to ensure compliance and to make recommendations for
training and discipline as needed; and (d) oversight would be provided by an Office of
State Police Affairs, the NJOAG, and an independent monitor (United States v. State of
New Jersey, Division of State Police, 1999). The documented successes that resulted
from this decree served as a model for the RIP directive established by the NJOAG
(2005a).
The New Jersey Legislature
Legislated laws are another way to control the actions of police officers. The New
Jersey legislature has outlawed the deprivation of civil rights by public officials (N.J.
Stat. Ann. 2C:30-2). Enforcement of this statute falls to the charge of official misconduct,
where a public servant knowingly injures or deprives another through an unauthorized act
relating to the exercise of their public office, or by refraining from performing a duty
imposed by law (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-2). In the case of RIP, the official misconduct
charge is considered a crime with a presumption of imprisonment; a mandatory minimum
term of five years and a maximum term of 10 years (N.J. Stat. Ann. 43:6-5). Where two
or more acts are alleged under official misconduct, there is an additional offense known
as patterns of official misconduct (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-7). The patterns of official
misconduct charge is also a crime with a presumption of a prison sentence, but upon
conviction cannot be merged with convictions for other offenses, such as official
misconduct, ensuring that the official serves additional time in prison for the pattern
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offense (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-7). These enactments were created to prevent racial
profiling and when necessary to punish those offenders.
The New Jersey Office of the Attorney General
The New Jersey Attorney General is authorized to implement a statewide policy
for both the police and prosecution functions. The Criminal Justice Act of 1970, declares
the Attorney General to be the chief law enforcement officer for the state (N.J. Stat. Ann.
52:17B-97 et seq.). The Act prescribes an integrated and hierarchical system of law
enforcement acting under the direction of the attorney general. This system is unusual in
the nation as most other states keep the prosecution function separate from the police
function (County Prosecutor Study Commission, 2011). However, the system ensures the
most efficient and effective use of criminal justice resources throughout the State (County
Prosecutor Study Commission, 2011). Two NJOAG regulations specifically influence
this study.
Racially-influenced policing directive. The NJOAG (2005a) RIP directive (see
Appendix A) established the first-in-the-nation statewide policy regarding the use of race
and ethnicity in police actions. This policy conforms with the Davis rule model and adds
a one-time pre-service and in-service training requirement using a material produced by
the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice. Officer discretion is confined and structured
in this written policy that unequivocally declares that no officer will use the race or
ethnicity of an individual as a factor when drawing inferences or conclusions of
involvement in criminal activity or as a factor in the exercise of discretion in stopping or
treating a person, including when choosing to use force. Officers are still permitted to use
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race and ethnicity when used to describe physical characteristics identifying a particular
individual being sought or investigated in the furtherance of an investigation. Officer
discretion is checked through the review of officer incident reports and behavior. This is
a policy weakness foreseen by Lipsky (2010), as supervision may be insufficient or
ineffective at spotting problem officers. Agencies are left to develop the standards and
mechanisms to find those problem officers without guidance from the state.
Use of force policy. The NJOAG (2000) use of force policy (see Appendix B)
sets the standard for both non- and deadly force. The directive follows the SCOTUS
objective reasonableness standard and the Davis rule model for confining, structuring,
and checking officer discretion. Discretion is confined and structured through this written
policy enunciating authorizations and limits to the use of non- and deadly force and the
display of firearms. Discretion is checked through mandated reporting requirements.
Also, officers are required to receive training on this policy at least twice per year. The
policy is a mixture of good and bad with regard to resolving the previously described
problems of conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement.
The Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy unintentionally helps to confuse the
matter of force conceptualization found elsewhere. The title alone confounds that issue
but is supplemented with other obscuring components. This is because the force policy
includes both coercion and force but offers no definition for either, and includes a force
continuum with elements of both. The continuum devised by the state includes, (a)
constructive authority, (b) physical contact, (c) physical force, (d) mechanical force, and
(e) deadly force. Constructive authority and physical contact are exclusively coercive
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while physical, mechanical, and deadly force are exclusively forceful. The obscurity of
force is an unfortunate matter that can and should be rectified so that a simple reading of
the policy can serve as a foundation for mutual understanding between the public and the
police.
Despite the conceptualization problem found in the policy, information located in
the policy and various state laws can be combined to make plain the definition of force
and resolve uncertainty involving in its operationalization. Using the policy and laws,
force is deduced to be the lawful physical actions undertaken by police officers to protect
persons or property or to overcome suspect resistance during the execution of their public
duties that intentionally or unintentionally attempt or inflict physiological harm,
impairment, or death (NJOAG, 2000; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-14[b]; 2C:3-3 et seq.; 2C:3-7
et seq.; 2C:11-1 et seq.). Given this definition of force, its operationalization is made
clear by the policy in the form of the force continuum. However, it is important to note
that the levels on the continuum do not represent sequential steps that must be followed
but are rather a range of options from which the office can choose based on the
circumstances presented. There is no expectation that officers will exhaust lower level
options before resorting to higher levels of force.
The policy overcomes the problem of measurement and permits practitioners and
policymakers to know precisely the number of non- and deadly force incidents that occur
in New Jersey. In an effort to check officer discretion, the policy requires that officers
submit reports through their chain of command for every instance in which physical,
mechanical, or deadly force was used. Assuming that all forceful incidents are properly
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reported, not only can the incident be quality reviewed by a supervisor or other entity, but
the frequency of all types of force used by officers can be easily measured at the local
level in real-time. Subsequent mandatory aggregate reporting to the county prosecutor
will make the frequency of force known at the county level on a regular basis. While the
policy does not specify other mandatory notifications of force, except in incidents
involving serious bodily injury or when any injury is caused by a firearm, it is
conceivable that a mechanism could constructed so that the extent of the force
phenomena within the state could be regularly quantified. Since it is possible to collect
and make know the frequency of force to practitioners and policymakers, this information
should be publicly and regularly published to increase police transparency and
accountability in the hopes of improving public trust and police legitimacy.
The policy does leave room for other areas of improvement. First, agencies are
permitted to customize the form officers complete when reporting uses of force (see
Appendix A), and based on the data collected for this study, do not require that they be
completed in full. This could make data collection of certain variables difficult and
complicate comparisons among agencies, as it did in my study. Second, the policy
proposes no required assessment of the data, at any level of government, once they are
collected and reported. Finally, it offers no suggested algorithm to turn the data into
meaningful information. Such tasks are left to the individuals and agencies who see those
data. If included, these elements might help with issues of accountability, transparency,
public trust, and legitimacy.
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New Jersey Police Agencies
Police agencies may also enact rules to control officer discretion and behavior.
Agency heads, known as appropriate authorities, are authorized under current and valid
municipal ordinances to adopt rules and regulations for the government and discipline of
its officers (N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:14-118). The NJOAG (2001) requires that the rules and
regulations be supplemented with policies and procedures. The rules define acceptable
and unacceptable officer behavior in broad terms, while policies and procedures are
detailed statements on how to accomplish job-related tasks for police operations. For
example, a rule might require officers to wear a particular uniform while engaged in
certain assignments while the precise details of that uniform would be expressed in the
policies and procedures. Under no circumstances may agency rules become less
restrictive than those of their higher authorities. To illustrate this point, my data
collection revealed that several agencies promulgated their own RIP directives prior to
the state mandate, choosing to establish a rule more restrictive than required. This
observation will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4.
Administrative Rules Influence Police Behavior
During the police reform movement of the 1960s, the President’s Crime
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) noted that police
agencies are not accustomed to their roles as policy-makers. The commission
recommended that police agencies develop and promulgate policies to guide officer
discretion during common situations involving the exercise of discretion and that the
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public is apprised in advance of the policy. Later research would confirm the utility of
rules governing police discretion.
Police agencies have successfully used rules to control the use of discretion by
their officers. Still, rules to control police discretion are a relatively new development
occurring mostly over the last 30 years beginning with examinations of rules restricting
deadly force (White, 2011). Prior to the 1970s, few departments had rules to control
deadly force, and those that existed had little impact on officer actions (U.S. President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). Officers
followed the common law fleeing felon doctrine which permitted officers to shoot any
suspected felon to prevent their escape (Walker, 1993; White, 2001). When agencies did
provide rules for deadly force, they did so with ambiguous statements and language, such
as requiring the use of good judgment and admonitions not to unholster their weapon in
anger (Walker, 1993; White, 2001). Public discord from several high-profile police
shootings created an environment that increased professional, government, and scholarly
examinations of police deadly force and the use of policies to confine officer discretion.
Few other professions have been granted the degree of discretion as police, and
with the exception of the military, no other profession has been granted the range of
discretion to exercise force alternatives. Rules provide written guidance and the
annunciation of expectations (Thibault, Lynch, McBride, & Walsh, 1998). Rules are
intended to reduce discretion and help officers prepare for the situations they might
encounter (Alpert & Fridell, 1992; Walker, 1993). The vein of scholarly research that has
explored the use of rules in policing has shown consistently that rules do constrain police
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actions, even during critical life-threatening events. Still, authors are steadfast in their
warning that rules must be clear, unambiguous, and supported by meaningful supervision
and discipline.
Walker and Archbold (2014) recommended that agencies develop policies to
control police discretion in critical incidents, defined as those events involving police
actions that pose a risk to life, liberty, and the dignity of a person. The list of possible
critical incidents is potentially endless, so the following portion of the literature review
will explore the more prominent critical issues that pose risks to life, liberty, and dignity
of a person.
Rules Reduce Deadly Force
Research on the ability of rules to control police discretion began with James
Fyfe, a New York City police officer and future deputy commissioner, who examined the
influence of the department’s deadly force policy. The New York City Police Department
was among the first in the nation to attempt controlling police discretion in using deadly
force as a matter of policy. The policy conformed with the Davis (1975) rule model.
Among the controls were (a) a mandate to use the defense of life standard, (b) certain
prohibitions on the use of firearms, (c) a requirement to complete a firearms discharge
report, (d) the review of all firearms discharges by a review board, and (e) listing of
possible sanctions for failure to conform with the policy (New York City Police
Department, 1972). Fyfe (1979) found the policy helped reduce firearms discharges by
29.9% over the first four years, suggesting that the policy aided in constraining
discretion. Significantly, the policy appeared to have no adverse impacts, such as
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increases in officer assaults or increases in the crime rate. Later research by Fyfe (1980;
1981, 1982, 1988), Walker (1993), and White (2000, 2001, 2003) confirmed the efficacy
of restrictive rules on deadly force in other large cities. The effects of the rules, however,
are nuanced, as they influence non- and elective shooting differently (White, 1999). The
results of this research were persuasive, leading to a national trend among police agencies
to enact similar deadly force policies (Walker, 1993). Walker suggested that the success
of restrictive deadly force policies should serve as a model for other efforts to control
police behavior.
Rules Reduce Non-Deadly Force
Unlike the deadly force research, the influence of policy on the use of less-lethal
force has not been thoroughly examined. A wealth of research has examined the structure
of rules, training, tactics, reporting, audits, and the force continuum (Alpert, Dunham, &
MacDonald, 2004; Bishopp, Klinger, & Morris, 2014; Hough & Tatum, 2012; McEwen,
1997; Pate & Fridell, 1993; 1995; Terrill & Paoline III, 2012). Other researchers have
examined the relationship of less-lethal policy on the use of deadly force (Ferdik,
Kaminski, Cooney, & Sevigny, 2014; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Thomas, Colins, &
Lovrich, 2010). Until recently, studies did not examine the influence of policy on the use
of a spectrum of less-lethal force options.
Terrill and Paoline (2016) provided the first study to assess the influence of policy
on the use of a range of less-lethal options. The authors reviewed force incidents from
three agencies with different degrees of policy. Controlling for situationally-based
factors, Terrill and Paoline found that more restrictive policies resulted in less force and
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less restrictive policies resulted in more force. It is interesting to note that the department
with the most restrictive policy also had the greatest number of officers and citizens, and
the highest crime rate. The results of this study offer a foundation for future studies and
provide promise that administrative rules may help achieve less forceful outcomes.
Rules Reduce Vehicle Pursuits
While somewhat glorified or sensationalized in the movies, television, and news
media, the pursuit of fleeing vehicles presents unintended but foreseeable risks of injury
or death and are a matter for public concern. Like deadly and non-deadly force, officers
were generally unrestricted in their pursuit-related decisions until the 1980s (Alpert &
Dunham, 1989; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Pursuits are an active attempt by police to
apprehend an occupant of a moving vehicle who deliberately resists that apprehension
through the continued use of the vehicle (Fennessey, as cited by Nugent, Connors,
McEwen, & Mayo, 1989). They expose the officers, suspect, and the public to loss of life,
serious injury, and significant property damage (Nugent et al., 1989). Without many
substantive data to support the notion, early policy discussions considered pursuits more
frequent than deadly force incidents and as a result of changes in deadly force, considered
creating policies for pursuits.
The literature involving the influence of restrictive policies on pursuit is scant.
Much of the research on the topic has examined the factors leading to decisions to pursue,
structural components of policy, the amount of force used after a pursuit ended, but
mostly centering on the danger of pursuits (Hicks, 2006). Research on rules began with
Nugent et al. (1989), whose study was hampered by poor pre-policy pursuit data, as was
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common among the police community. Although the data were poor, the authors were
able to determine a trend that seemed to indicate a decrease in pursuit frequency after the
implementation of the policy. Later research conducted with better data also found
restrictive policies reduced pursuits (Becknell et al., 1999; Crew et al, 1995). While the
literature is not as robust in this area, the existing literature shows promise that rules
effectively reduce officer discretion during these critical incidents.
Value of Rules Governing Racial Profiling Is Inconclusive
Beliefs that police engage in racial profiling is at the heart of the trust problem
between the public and police. The view that officers engage in such behavior threatens
the principle of fair and equal treatment under the law. The 1990s presented the political
tipping point as public concerns increased social and political pressures to stop the
phenomenon (Warren & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2009). Since then, numerous agency and
scholarly examinations have been made to determine if police agencies engage in RIP,
particularly during traffic stops, searches, and arrest. Studies have shown that Blacks are
disproportionately stopped, searched, and arrested in proportions greater than their
representation in the general population (Engel & Johnson, 2006; Parker, MacDonald,
Alpert, Smith, & Piquero, 2004; Skolnick, 2007), while other researchers have found the
opposite or mixed results (Engel et al., 2005; Novak, 2004; Smith & Petrocelli, 2001).
While studies quantifying the phenomenon are plentiful, studies examining the influences
of policy are not.
Despite the attention given to the racial profiling problem, little attention has been
given to police agencies policy responses (K. Miller, 2009). Of particular note is the
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dearth of information related to the effectiveness of policies intended to prohibit RIP.
Two studies were found that address the topic in limited fashion. Shultz and Withrow
(2004) sought to determine the operational influence of officer-generated forms during
race-based policing studies but found that neither the reports nor the study had an
influence on organizational changes. They postulated that racial profiling has not
developed traction among police agencies and that many agencies may enact RIP
prohibitions as a symbolic gesture in response to social and political demands. In a more
significant study, Warren and Tomaskovic-Devey (2009) conducted a time-series
analysis of the North Carolina Highway Patrol interdiction team between 1997-2000
using agency collected data. They sought to measure searches and successful searches
before and after the enactment of the North Carolina law requiring police to collect
specific racial data during traffic stops. The results showed that the law significantly
reduced racial disparities in traffic stops, decreased the use of consent searches, and
increased the probability of finding contraband during the searches. The scarcity of
studies on the topic has not helped determine the value of RIP prohibitions, but in this
study I contributed to that literature.
Challenges Posed by the Findings in the Use of Force Literature
In the previous sections, I addressed limitations related to data collection and
analysis of police uses of force, the effectiveness of rules in constraining police discretion
during critical incidents, and the New Jersey rules and rule makers as background for this
study. Recent uses of force by police on racial minority members throughout the nation
has caused numerous protests and calls for police reforms from the public and elected

65
officials (Weitzer, 2015). Recent opinion polls have found public confidence in the police
to be at an all-time low with many believing that officers do not fairly treat racial
minority members (Jones, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2014). The publics’ lack of trust
in the police damages the legitimacy and authority of the police and government, and
threatens the quality of life of all citizens, particularly communities comprised of racial
minority populations (Keita, 2014; Meares et al., 2014; Nix et al,, 2014; Rahr & Rice,
2014; Richardson, 2015; White House, 2014). Administrative rules offer an opportunity
to promote that trust by constraining police actions detrimental to the public trust but
their effectiveness in eliminating RIP is unclear. In this study, I examined the relevant
data to determine if the New Jersey RIP directive is effective at stopping racial disparities
in uses of force by police.
An integral part of this study is the review of the findings of previous police use
of force studies. Unfortunately, the findings of the extant literature present challenges to
understanding that concept for two reasons. First, few studies conceptualize force in the
same manner while some provide no conceptualization. This was an issue that Garner et
al. (1995) attempted to overcome by offering a model definition that was limited to
intentional threats, attempts, and infliction of physical harm. Second, the majority of
studies operationalize force in different ways, leaving this field of research without a
consistent list of actions that constitute force. In some cases, this was because of
dissimilar force continuums. Agency force continuums widely differ across the nation
(Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010; Terrill & Paoline III, 2012). As a result, verbal commands
and physical contact might be considered force at one agency while not in another. These
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issues lead to the question, have police uses of force changed over time, or have actions
considered force been broadened? The lack of consistency in both conceptualization and
operationalization confounds the construct of force and makes a comparison of findings
across studies difficult.
Force in this study is conceptualized in the manner stricter than that provided by
Garner et al. (1995) who included coercion (threats). This study also goes against the
recommendation of Klahm, Frank, and Liederbach (2014) who, after examining the
conceptualization of force across many studies, supported the use of the Garner definition
in future research. I chose to do this as a practical matter to align with the state policy.
The definition for this study was chosen because it reflects the laws and policies of New
Jersey which are taught to police officers in the police academy and in-service training.
This study is not intended to measure nonviolent acts of coercion, and, as such, it is
similar to those who have studied police use of violence by examining official
government records (see Crown & Adrion, 2011; Hoffman & Hickey, 2005; Johnson,
2011; Morabito & Doerner, 1997). My decision to use a stricter definition is supported by
in the writings of Garner et al.
Garner et al. (1995) asserted that their conceptualization of force, based on the
National Academy of Sciences definition of violence, was simply to serve as a substitute
where no precise definition existed. They chose this definition because it “did a good job
in capturing what the research literature on police use of force typically means by
‘force’” (Garner et al., 1995, p. 152). Their research was not concerned with creating a
definition of force but rather with developing measures of the nature and extent of force
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used by and against police officers that had been discussed in prior studies. The authors
conceded that the presence of a heavily armed individual might be thought of as
inherently threatening and could be considered forceful thus transforming all policecitizen encounters into forceful incidents. This conceptualization would be better named
police coercion, of which force would be a subset. The title change would align with
common and legal definitions of coercion (Law Dictionary, n.d.-b). It would also reflect
the reality that all police-citizen encounters entail the risk of force when civilians resist
the lawful orders of an officer.
Data for this study were based on historical and publicly available official
government records. The New Jersey Use of Force Report must be completed each time
force is used and releasable under the New Jersey Open Public Records Act (N.J. Stat.
Ann. 47:1A-1 et seq.). The form offers predetermined checkboxes for officers to indicate
the presence of factors that led to their use of force and the nature of the force that was
applied. It provides only a high-level picture of the incident and does not reflect the
transactional nature of the police-citizen encounter as had been done in other research
(Alpert, Dunham, & MacDonald, 2004; Terrill, 2001; 2003). This is unfortunate, as many
subtleties are lost but which may appear in the officers’ incident reports. Those reports
are unavailable as they are classified as criminal records and are exempt from public
disclosure (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-1.1). While I cannot examine the transactional nature of
the encounter, such an examination is beyond the scope of this research. Although those
data would better aid the understanding of each incident, the loss of that contextual data
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does change the outcome of the incident, which is ultimately the result being studied
here.
The variables involved in the transactional nature of the police-citizen encounter
are important to understanding the context in which force is used. Police have the
authority and duty to use force to carry out lawful objectives and to protect their lives and
the lives of others. In doing so, an officer must perceive those variables, tailor a response,
and then physically respond. Decisions and responses may not be static as new
information may be observed that requires changes to the initial response. Failure to
appropriately carry out those mental and physical sequences could lead to unfortunate
consequences for the officer, the subject, and others. Many of the variables collected on
the New Jersey use of force report form have been the subject of previous research. Five
categories of variables that influence police uses of force have been identified in previous
research, (a) suspect, (b) encounter, (c) officer, (d) neighborhood, and (e) organization.
The use of force report form collects many but not all studied factors in the suspect,
officer, and encounter categories. Suspect factors include gender, race, age, weapon,
intoxication, and resistance. Officer factors include gender, race, age, years of service,
duty status, and the wear of a uniform. Encounter factors include suspect actions and
charges, type of incident, and the presence of a weapon. A review of these categories and
variables is included later in this chapter along with reviews of other studied categories
and variables not collected on the report form.
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Sample Force Scenario
An example scenario can illustrate the interaction of variables influencing officer
decisions. This scenario represents a degree of realism demonstrating the plethora of
variables officers might encounter and how events can unpredictably unfold.
Late one busy night, somewhere in Small-Town U.S.A., in an area known for
violent crime, two officers are sent to a robbery in progress at a local gas station. The
dispatcher tells the officers on the police radio that several callers report a man hitting
and threatening to kill the attendant if he does not give the suspect the money from the
register and safe. No callers report seeing any weapon. Prior to their arrival, no additional
information about the events is communicated to the officers. Simultaneously, the
officers arrive from different directions in their separate patrol cars to see many cars
blocking the gas pumps, a small crowd of onlookers, and what appears to be a frail man
in his 70s striking a young and diminutive attendant with open hands. The officers get out
of their respective cars and in a show of constructive authority announce their presence
and demand the suspect stop hitting the attendant. Someone yells to the officers that the
man is drunk. Both officers run to the aid of the attendant. One officer approaches the
suspect from the front while the other approaches from behind. The suspect stops to look
at both officers but picks up a window squeegee and proceeds to assault the attendant
with it. As the front officer closes to 15 feet from the suspect, he uses mechanical force
by taking out his pepper spray and spraying the suspect. Seemingly unfazed, the frail man
reaches into his waistband and begins to pull out an object that resembles a handgun. The
man then shouts to the officer in the front, “Time to die, cop!” Believing it to be a
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functional and loaded handgun that the subject intends to shoot, that officer yells, “Gun!”
to alert his partner while simultaneously moving to a nearby position of cover that offers
a small degree of protection and draws his handgun. Neither officer is close enough to
use physical force to disarm the man, but, even if they were, the officers know that it
would be an exceptionally dangerous task in which they might not be successful and
during which they might get shot. The officer to the front aims his handgun at the man
but decides he cannot shoot because a missed shot would endanger the crowd of
onlookers that has gathered behind the man. The officer to the rear does not see the
handgun but did hear his partner yell that the man had a gun, as he saw his partner
unholster and point his weapon at the man while moving to cover. Fearing for the life of
his partner and others, and with no danger to anyone in the background, the officer
behind the suspect elects to use deadly force by upholstering his weapon, aiming it at the
suspect, and pulling the trigger.
This scenario presents a quickly developing set of circumstances in which officers
moved along a force continuum based upon their observation of the suspect, combined
with the knowledge and experience officers may gain throughout their careers. Not only
did they need to consider the variables in their force decisions; they also needed to
consider factors about whether they could use force without endangering bystanders and
other officers. This story might seem convoluted, but rarely are use of force incidents so
straightforward.
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Factors Contributing to Police Officer Uses of Force
Suspect characteristics. The characteristics of suspects is an area of literature
with numerous studies. Researchers have examined factors specific to individual
suspects, as detailed in the subordinate sections.
Age. The age of a suspect has not been consistently shown to influence officer
decisions to use force. Most studies show that age and force use are inversely related
(McCluskey, Terrill, & Paoline III, 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2007; Phillips & Smith,
2000; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill et al., 2003). Advancing
age was found to reduce shows of constructive authority and physical force by male
officers, and to reduce physical force by female officers (Paoline III & Terrill, 2007).
Crawford and Burns (1998) found that younger ages were more likely to experience
physical force but no more likely to experience constructive authority, mechanical force,
or deadly force. Other studies found age not to be significant or not significant when
officers respond to domestic disputes (Engel, Sobel, & Worden, 2000; Garner et al.,
2002; Kaminski, Digiovanni, & Downs, 2004; Sun & Payne, 2004).
Demeanor. Demeanor is a well-studied factor in the literature, but one which has
produced conflicting results. Suspects exhibiting hostile non-violent demeanor have been
found to be more likely recipients of force (Engel et al., 2000; Garner et al., 2002;
Kaminski et al., 2004; Lawton, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne, 2004;
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Crawford and Burns (1998) found that hostile suspects were
more likely to receive physical force but no more likely to be subject to constructive
authority or deadly force. Still, other studies found no effect of demeanor on force
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(McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005; 2007; Terrill, 2005; Terrill &
Mastrofski, 2002). From a practical perspective, some instances of non-violent but hostile
demeanor may be lawfully protected speech. Officers who take official actions solely in
response to lawfully protected speech commit a constitutional violation (Hartman v.
Moore, 2006). The studies do not make this distinction which complicates interpretations
of their results.
Gender. Another of the heavily studies variables, the gender of the suspect has
shown varied influence on force. Most studies show that officers are more likely to apply
force to male subjects (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Garner et al., 2002; Kaminski,
DiGiovanni, & Downs, 2004; McCluskey et al., 2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005;
Phillips & Smith, 2000; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne, 2004; Terrill &
Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill et al., 2003). Still, others found a nonsignificant relationship between suspects’ gender and force (Engel et al., 2000; Johnson,
2011; Lawton, 2007).
Intoxication. Intoxication has been widely researched but offers mixed results.
Many studies have found intoxication to positively influence officer uses of force (Engel
et al., 2000; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline III & Terrill,
2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003, 2008).
Other studies did not find the relationship significant (Morabito & Doerner, 1997;
Phillips & Smith, 2000; Schuck, 2004). A meta-analysis by Bolger (2014) found that
suspect intoxication increases the likelihood of force.
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Most of these studies suffered from the flaw that they did not differentiate drugrelated intoxication from alcohol-related intoxication. Crawford and Burns (1998) found
that the type of intoxication influences force differently; alcohol intoxication increases
the likelihood of constructive authority, and drug intoxication does not. Drug intoxication
increases the likelihood of nonlethal force; alcohol does not (Garner et al., 2002; Lawton,
2007; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005; Terrill, 2005). As such, further research is needed on
the differences between legal and illegal intoxicating substances.
Mental illness. The realm of police encounters with those suffering from mental
illness has been researched only modestly. This is unfortunate, as responding to the needs
of the mentally ill is a routine part of policing (M. S. Morabito, 2007; Walker &
Archbold, 2014). Police spend as much as 10% of their time handling situations
involving those with mental illness (Cordner, 2006).Studies have shown that police
contacts with those believed to have mental illness mostly involved low-level offenses
and those who infrequently pose a risk of harm to others (Bower & Pettit, 2001; Green,
1997). Individuals do engage the police with violent or threatening behavior to induce
officers to kill them, a situation known as suicide-by-cop (American Association of
Suicidology, 2013; Patton & Fremouw, 2016). Despite the regularity of their interactions,
many officers acknowledge they do not have sufficient resources or training to address
those with mental illness (Reuland, Schwartzfeld, & Draper, 2009).
Few studies exist examining the influence of mental illness on the use of force.
The studies that have been conducted found no significant relationship between mental
illness and force (Johnson, 2011; McCluskey et al., 2005; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002).
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Bolger (2014) attributed these results to the possible relationship mental illness has with
acts of resistance and drug and alcohol abuse.
Race. Race has been a heavily studied variable in officer force decisions but the
body of literature appears inconclusive. There are several studies indicating a positive
relationship between non-White suspects and force use (Belvedera, Worrall, & Tibbetts,
2005; Crow & Adrion, 2011; Engel & Calnon, 2004; Hyland et al., 2015; Leinfelt, 2005;
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003). Fryer (2016) found that Blacks and
Hispanics were more likely to experience non-deadly force but were no more likely than
Whites to be subjected to deadly force. Blacks have been found to be more likely to
experience force when not compliant with officer commands, no more likely when
offering resistance, and more likely to experience force until the addition of contextual
neighborhood factors whereupon they are no more likely to experience force than other
races (Garner et al., 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003). Several other studies have indicated no
significant relationship between race and force (Engel et al., 2000; Lawton, 2007;
McCluskey et al., 2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Phillips
& Smith, 2000; Sun & Payne, 2004).
Social class. Numerous studies have examined the influence of social class on
police uses of force. Most studies found that lower social class is associated with higher
uses of force (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2007; Terrill &
Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010).
Terrill (2005) found that social class use of force was dependent on the gender of the
officer. Still, McCluskey et al. (2005) and Sun and Payne (2004) found no relationship
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between social class and force. The results of these studies might be considered
somewhat dubious as race and ethnicity are closely related to social class (Friedrich,
1980; Hayward, Miles, Crimmins, & Yang, 2000). Additionally, in many studies, the
measures were based on the perceptions of the observers and subject to possible biases.
Bolger’s (2014) meta-analysis found that minority males with lower social class were
more likely to experience force.
Encounter characteristics. Encounter characteristics are those presented during
the interaction between the officer and the citizen. These factors are not linked to suspect
or officer and vary among encounters.
Arrest. Several studies have been conducted to determine if an officer is more
likely to use force during an arrest. The research has consistently shown that officers are
more likely to use force in arrest situations (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et
al., 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2004; 2007; Terrill et al., 2003). However, the research
does not indicate if force was used before, during, or after the arrest. This leaves to
speculation whether the force could be in response to an assault upon the officer, legal
force necessary to affect an arrest or control a subject, or a potential instance of unlawful
and excessive force. Additionally, some studies consider procedural actions such as
handcuffing to be force but which may be required for all arrests per departmental rules.
While the arrest variable might appear consistent, the results of these studies, on the
whole, are tenuous. In this study, arrest is not a considered variable because force
application without an arrest in New Jersey is considered inappropriate in most
circumstances.
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Conflict. Conflict is not a well-studied variable and has only appeared in the
literature in the last several years. Despite the fewer number of studies, the suspect’s
involvement in a conflict with another person has been found to significantly influence
force decisions (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill,
2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). In other studies, the results were mixed and varied by
jurisdiction and type of conflict (Paoline III & Terrill, 2005; Terrill et al., 2003). Engel,
et al. (2000) found no significant influence of the variable.
Criminal behavior. Criminal behavior has been linked to police uses of force.
When there is evidence of criminal behavior on the part of the suspect, the likelihood of
force application is increased (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005;
Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Like studies of other variables,
these studies make some interpretation difficult. Criminal behavior is not well defined
and could include or be counted as another category, such as resistance or proactive
contact.
Presence of other officers or citizens. The presence of other officers has become
a subject of interest over the last several years and the results are mixed. Several studies
have found that the presence of more officers increased the likelihood for force (Garner et
al., 2002; Paoline III & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Lawton (2007)
discovered that additional officers reduced the likelihood of force, while Phillips and
Smith (2000) found a negative relationship only when three or more officers were
present. Other studies indicated no significant relationship between the factors (Engel et
al., 2000). Terrill et al., (2003) found that their results were dependent on the location of
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the incident. From a practical perspective and for reasons of officer safety, more officers
are typically assigned to more significant incidents or those incidents where violence is
considered likely or expected. Studies linking the number of officers to increased force
use did not necessarily account for this practice which may help explain correlations
between the number of officers and force.
Like the presence of officers, the presence of citizens is a recent area of study.
The presence of other citizens has been shown to have no influence on decisions to use
force (McCluskey, Terrill, & Paoline III, 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005; 2007; Schuck,
2004; Terrill, 2005; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003; Terrill et al., 2008).
Crawford and Burns (1998) found that the presence of bystanders increased the use of
physical force but not mechanical or deadly force. Similar to the number of officers, these
studies have not accounted the reason behind the presence of other citizens. A crowd of
peaceful onlookers might have a different effect on officer behavior than an unruly crowd
perceived by the officer to pose a danger.
Proactive contact. Police officers come into contact with citizens in a variety of
ways but they typically fall into two categories, citizen-initiated and proactive contact.
Citizen-initiated contacts result from 9-1-1 calls or other requests for police services,
such as waving down an officer, an activated burglar alarm, or other means (Selby,
Singleton, & Flosi, 2016). When officers initiate police actions on their own volition, it is
considered proactive contact, and the results on its influence in force decisions are mixed.
Several studies found that proactive contact increased the likelihood of force (Johnson,
2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007;
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Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Garner et al. (2002), Paoline and
Terrill (2005), Terrill (2005); and Terrill et al. (2003) found that proactive contact did not
influence force unless the suspect offered resistance.
Resistance. Resistance is encountered when a suspect does not comply with
officer demands. Suspect resistance has been found to increase the likelihood for force
(Crew & Adrion, 2011; Johnson, 2001; Lee, Jang, Yun, Lim, & Tushaus, 2010;
McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2004, 2007;
Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Schuck, 2004; Terrill, et al., 2003; Terrill et al., 2008). Only
one study found no significant relationship between these factors (Lawton, 2007).
Belverere, Worrall, and Tibbetts (2005) linked suspect race to resistance in their findings
that indicated Black suspects were more likely to resist than White or Hispanic suspects.
Finally, Bolger’s (2014) meta-analysis found the resistance increased the likelihood that
officers will use force.
Weapon presence. Only a small number of studies have assessed the influence
the presence of a weapon has on decisions to use force. Various studies have shown a
positive influence on the presence of a weapon and force usage (Johnson, 2011;
McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne,
2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Mixed results have also been found (Crawford &
Burns, 1998; Kaminski et al., 2004; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Terrill et al., 2003). Only
one study found no significant relationship between weapons and force (McCluskey et
al., 2005).
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The weapon variable is fundamental to the public’s confidence problem with the
police. News media reporting often highlights in article titles when a suspect involved in
police violence was unarmed or denounces the killing of unarmed people (Black, 2014;
Brennan, 2016; Domonoske, 2016; Ferner, 2014; Southall, 2015). However, what
constitutes a weapon is subjective, and the fact that someone is unarmed does not also
mean that he or she presented no threat to an officer. Someone acting in a menacing
manner while holding an object that a reasonable officer perceives to be a functional
weapon is a threat to the officer (Fitzsimmons, 2014; Greene, 2016). Incidents such as
these have resulted in multiple unfortunate injuries and deaths (Fitzsimmons, 2014;
Greene, 2016). Someone possessing greater physical qualities or skills may also present a
threat. For analysts to better understand these incidents, it is important to consider
contextual factors rather than treating them only as a dichotomous choice between
unarmed and armed.
Officer characteristics. Numerous studies have examined the relationship of
officer characteristics on use of force. These characteristics are specific to the individual
officer. Unlike encounter characteristics, the research has not found many consistent
variables.
Age. The age of an officer is not a well-studied area and remains an inconclusive
factor in force use. Garner et al. (2002) found that older officers were less likely to use
force and Hein (2011) found that younger officers were more likely to employ a Taser
(mechanical force). Crawford and Burns (1998) found no statistically significant
relationship between age and use of force.
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Citizen complaints. Research is unclear about the influence of complaints
regarding officer behavior and use of force. Prior research has found that only a small
percentage of officers are responsible for the majority of complaints (C. J. Harris, 2008,
2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Terrill & Ingram, 2016). Officers have been found to
be more likely to receive complaints from proactive encounters, arrests, and felony
arrests (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001; K. M. Lersch, 2002; M. Lersch &
Mieczkowski, 1996). Terrill and Ingram (2016) found that less experienced officers were
more likely to receive complaints. McCluskey and Terrill (2005) found a positive
relationship between complaints and use of force. However, complaints may simply be a
function of productivity (Brandl et al., 2001; Hassell & Archbold, 2010; K. M. Lersch.,
2002; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005). In some cases, citizens file complaints against
officers in the hope that the complaint will influence the disposition of their charges.
There is no indication that complaints equate to a problem officer engaged in misconduct
or inappropriate behavior. Therefore, this variable might be unreliable because of its
relationship to other factors.
Education. Education has been found to be a significant predictor of force use.
Officers who are most educated have been found to use the least force (Aamodt, 2004;
McElvain & Kposowa, 2008; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010;
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Worden (1995) found officers with a bachelor’s degree or
higher were more likely to use force. Sun and Payne (2004) and Hein (2011) found a
nonsignificant relationship between education and force. Interestingly, the results of Lim

81
and Lee (2015) suggest that education may have more influence on force than
supervision in reducing force use.
Implicit racial bias. Implicit bias is an area of study spanning well beyond the
concept of police use of force but in which the criminal justice community has been
heavily studied. Implicit bias occurs when, although unaware, individuals base their
decisions to take actions on racially biased motivations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
Using various methods to operationalize racial shooter bias, particularly response times
and error rates, studies have shown that community members and police officers differ in
simulated force scenarios. Citizens were found to be quicker to shoot Black subjects than
officers and did so with more errors than police officers (Correll, Park, Judd, &
Wittenbrink, 2002; Correll, Hudson, Guillermo, & Ma, 2014; Plant & Peruche, 2005).
Other studies found that police participants were slower to shoot Black suspects than
Whites or Hispanics evidencing some favor for racial minority suspects (James, Vila, &
Daratha, 2012; James, Klinger, & Vila, 2014; James, James, & Vila, 2016). Still, other
research has indicated no differences in participant reaction times to shoot Black or
White targets (Harmer, 2012; Taylor, 2011). Cox, Devine, Plant and Schwartz (2014)
found that police officers were faster to shoot armed Black suspects in pictorial
depictions and slower in video scenarios but throughout they made few errors regardless
of race. They found no pattern indicating a tendency for police officers to mistakenly
shoot unarmed Black suspects more than White suspects. A possible reason is that the
length of police experience is negatively related to shooting errors (Correll, et al., 2007;
Peruche & Plant, 2006).
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Mekawi and Bresin (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of 16 racial shooter bias
studies involving participants from student and police populations. They acknowledged
that a cursory review of the literature provided evidence of racial shooter bias but that the
studies lack common operationalization and offer selective reporting making their
interpretation difficult. Still, the analysis showed that participants were faster to shoot
Blacks, slower to decide not to shoot unarmed Blacks, and had a larger shooting bias
against Blacks. Mekawi and Bresin also found that increased participant contact with
Blacks was related to the more liberal shooting thresholds against Blacks contrary to
intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). However, the findings of Mekawi
and Bresin do not necessarily contrast with those of Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) because
intergroup contact theory has several conditions that could not be addressed in their
analysis.
Comparison studies examining differences in responses between civilian samples
and police officers highlights the distinction between the two groups and offers caution in
attempts to generalize non-officer responses to the police actions. Research suggests that
police officers are able to assert cognitive control over their implicit biases (Mekawi &
Bresin, 2015). While racial shooter bias studies suffer from limitations in the ability to
generalize across the nation, the results challenge popular notions that implicit bias
causes officers to shoot Black suspects and may be a factor influencing this study.
Gender. Many researchers have examined the role of officer gender on uses of
force, but the results are mixed. Most studies find no significant relationship (Hoffman &
Hickey, 2005; Lawton, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill et
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al., 2008; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Hein (2011) found no significant relationship in
gender and deployment of a Taser. Johnson (2011) found that males officers are more
likely to use force, while an older study found that male officers used more severe forms
of force (Garner et al., 2002). Terill and Paoline (2005) offered a more nuanced set of
results finding that male officers use higher degrees of force on men and lesser degrees
on women. Bolger’s (2014) meta-analysis showed that male officers were more likely to
use force but this finding had a small effect size.
Race. Officer race and its relationship to force has been the subject of much
research mostly indicating that there is no relationship between the variables. Several
studies have failed to find a strong relationship (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Garner et al.,
1995; Lawton, 2007; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002).
Other studies found race to be a significant factor until neighborhood characteristics were
introduced at which point race became insignificant (Garner et al. 2002; Rydberg &
Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne, 2004). Correll, Wittenbrink, Park, Judd, and Goyle (2011)
conducted a study using university students and found that race and the perceived threat
of the physical environment combined to influence the use of deadly force in picture and
video simulations. The Correll et al (2011) study indicated that racial threat perception
may be one component of a more comprehensive threat-detection process. Similar studies
have not been conducted using police officers.
Neighborhood characteristics. Neighborhood characteristic studies include
some of the earliest that evaluate a relationship with force and generally has discovered
no significant relationships. One line of study involved neighborhoods perceived as

84
dangerous. Crime rates were associated with greater uses of force (Lee et al., 2010;
Terrill & Reisig, 2003), although Lawton (2007) failed to find a significant relationship.
Neighborhoods characterized by a disproportionate number of calls for police service and
a greater likelihood of suspect resistance also increased the likelihood of force use
(Alpert et al., 2004). Another line of research involved community income levels. A
significant relationship was found, but the measure was included in a broader variable
unrelated to income (McCluskey et al., 2005; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).
Organization characteristics. Organizational characteristics include culture,
training, and managerial controls. Cooney (2009) found organizational factors had a
limited effect of force. Studies have found officers apply less force when the supervisor
must complete the force report instead of the officer (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001). Active
supervisors increase the likelihood that officers will use force and will be more likely to
use force themselves (Engel, 2015). Lim and Lee (2015) found that the education level of
a supervisor is inversely proportional to the force use of their subordinates. Importantly,
Lim and Lee found that officers who work for a supervisor without a bachelor’s degree or
higher will more likely to use force on non-White subjects, while no such relationship
existed with more highly educated supervisors. Finally, the presence of a supervisor at a
scene did not have a significant influence on force use (Engel, 2015).
Summary
Numerous public opinion polls have indicated an all-time low confidence level in
police and their ability to fairly treat racial minority populations. This reduced confidence
coincided with widespread and highly publicized deaths of Black men attributed to police
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extrajudicial killings (Jones, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2014). However, public opinion
stands in contrast to established public policies outlawing RIP. Many of the states in
which highly publicized deaths took place have rules prohibiting RIP (NAACP, 2014).
Given the allegations that police do not fairly treat minorities, the underlying assertion is
that officers are not following the rules when fulfilling public policy.
Rules are common and sometimes broken in police work. Rules provide written
guidance and the annunciation of expectations to officers (Thibault et al., 1998). Prior
research has suggested that police agencies are able to control the behavior of their
officers across a span of police actions through the use of rules (Becknell et al., 1999;
Crew et al., 1995; Fyfe 1978, 1979; Terrill & Paoline; 2016; Walker, 1993; White, 2000,
2001, 2003). Additional studies show that most officers follow the rules (C. J. Harris,
2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Walker, 2001b). Still, there are instances where
officers engage in misconduct. SLBT helps explain gaps between the policy and rules to
the actual behavior of offending officers (Lipsky, 2010). Where racial disparities exist in
police uses of force, they may be the result of explicit bias or the effect of implicit bias on
the coping mechanisms created by officers in response to their working environment.
Prior research associated with police uses of force has had significant limitations.
Scholarly studies have suffered from inconsistent conceptualizations and
operationalizations of force (Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010). Similar
difficulties are found in media reporting and publicly available databases concerning
police killings. When frequency data are reported, external benchmarking is the
predominant form of comparison and the one most used by the media and protest groups
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(Engel & Calnon, 2004; Withrow & Williams, 2015). However, external benchmarking
has numerous disadvantages that may lead to inaccurate findings that exacerbate the
public’s perception that police unfairly treat racial minorities (Cox et al., 2001; Walker,
2001a; Withrow & Williams, 2015; Zingraff et al., 2000). Inconsistent definitions and
behaviors constituting force and poor benchmarking make it difficult to gauge the extent
of the force phenomenon and burden efforts to compare findings across multiple sources.
Police uses of force have been shown to be the result of a combination of
numerous variables. For several years, scholars have examined the role of suspect,
officer, encounter, neighborhood, and organizational characteristics on officer uses of
force (e.g., Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010). Many variables have been
demonstrated to affect force outcomes, particularly those involving the seriousness of the
crime and resistance (Bolger, 2014). Yet neither the federal government nor the media
have collected or explained the importance of these factors on force outcomes. The flaws
in defining force, collecting data, and conducting analysis cloud public discourse and
complicate attempts to address public policy issues and the problem of public trust in
police.
This study overcame the limitations of prior scholarly and popular research to
examine the influence of rules prohibiting RIP on police uses of force in one New Jersey
county. First, the conceptualization and operationalization of both RIP and force were
standardized across participating sites by state law and policy. The definition and actions
constituting force were aligned with common and legal definitions and were consistent
with most high-profile incidents which have influenced public confidence in the police.
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Second, non- and deadly force data was collected through a mandatory reporting
mechanism established by state policy. Third, that mechanism collected data on several
variables that have been the subject of previous scholarly research. Finally, I analyzed
force outcomes for racial disparities using statistical methods that do not suffer from the
limitations present in benchmarking methods. This study filled the gap in scholarly
research related to the use of rules to prevent RIP. The findings address the value of such
rules in controlling police behavior, particularly the influence of rules prohibiting RIP on
officer uses of force. In Chapter 3, I explain the details of the research design and
methodology of this study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
I examined the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on police uses of force
to determine if it prevents officers from using race as a factor in their decisions and
whether it is useful as a tool for public administrators. A quantitative retrospective
analysis of government records documenting police uses of force was used for this
purpose. The extant literature has shown that administrative rules are effective at
constraining officer actions during critical incidents involving force (Anderson et al.,
2002; Bishopp et al., 2014; Fyfe, 1978; 1979; Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). If rules are
effective at preventing RIP, then applying force should not disproportionately affect any
racial category.
Chapter 3 provides the quantitative methodology used to examine the influence of
the RIP directive on officer uses of force. In it, I discuss the statistical designs and
sampling procedures. I also detail the procedures for data collection, analysis, and threats
to validity.
Research Design and Rationale
A nonexperimental retrospective quantitative design was used to examine the
influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on documented officer uses of force upon
people of various races between June 2000 and June 2010 in one New Jersey county. The
independent variable was the existence or absence of the RIP directive. The dependent
variable was the highest level of force used by the officer. The independent variable of
interest was the race of the subject. Numerous variables affect force outcomes. I had
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intended to control for all factors found on the model use of force reporting form but due
to imperfections in the collected data, I was required to conduct a binomial logistic
regression controlling for six factors and an interaction term. The controlled factors were:
(a) the promulgation of the RIP directive, (b) officer tenure, (c) suspect race, (d) suspect
age, (e) suspect resistance, and (f) unusual conditions. These factors are described later in
this chapter.
The force use examined was bounded by location, employing agency, and time. I
examined documented municipal police officer uses of force in one New Jersey county.
Municipal police are the predominant form of policing in the state—the officers with
whom the public has the greatest contact. Municipal police officers are also differentiated
from other police officers by statute (N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:14-152; 40A:14-152.1).
Therefore, force used by police officers, sheriff’s officers, and corrections officers
employed by the county, state, and federal agencies that conduct law enforcement
activities within the county were excluded. Two time periods were examined: June 2000
to June 2005, after the communication of the New Jersey use of force policy but before
the RIP directive, and July 2005 to June 2010, after the promulgation of the RIP directive
and before any policy changes expanding force options were available to officers.
A data set was created from completed use of force reporting forms. Using
government records to create this data set was appropriate for three reasons: (a) such
records provided access to a specific population to which I lacked personal access; (b)
they provided a large amount of data to examine empirical questions about populations
that were not anticipated when the data were collected; and (c) there was a strong fit
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between the data and research question (Fisher & Anushko, 2008). Further, Bazley,
Lersch, and Mieczkowski (2007) used similar reporting forms during their examination
of officer force and suspect resistance in an urban police department. Quantitative
nonexperimental retrospective designs using government records and regression analysis
have been used in several examinations of public policy involving political economy and
recidivism, the impact of child passenger safety programs, and the influence of financial
aid policies on college completion (Everett, 2014; Phillippe, 2012; Ragland, 2016).
Time and legal constraints were influential in choosing this design. At least 151
municipal police agencies are located throughout New Jersey’s 8,723 square miles (New
Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, n.d.; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010.). I was the
only researcher conducting this study and was unable to effectively manage data
collection from this number of agencies over such a large geographic area to achieve my
proposed stratified proportionate random sampling method (see the methodology
section). Moreover, I needed to expeditiously collect data before a potentially devastating
New Jersey Supreme Court decision that could have limited my access to the needed
data. Collecting data from one county eased the difficulties associated with data
collection and permitted me to more speedily collect data before a ruling by the New
Jersey Supreme Court.
Resource constraints were also influential in choosing this design. First, to
conduct this study as an observation would have been impossible. One could not observe
force use during a time when the RIP directive was not in force, as those years have
passed. Second, the use of force by police is rare, and the time it would take to do an
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observational study, particularly with only one researcher, would be prohibitive.
Therefore, creating a data set from submitted force reporting forms was the most
achievable and accurate way to conduct this study.
Methodology
Population
The target population for this study was all documented municipal police officer
uses of force in one New Jersey county between June 2000 and June 2010. I elected to
use municipalities in only one county to ensure a degree of consistency among the police
agencies’ rules and practices, which may have affected force outcomes and might
otherwise have been absent when using municipal agencies from more than one county.
Consistency in rules and practices was expected because all municipal agencies within
the county are subject to the authority and oversight of their county prosecutor. Neither
the state of New Jersey nor the subject county publishes in public forums information
related to the force used by police officers in that county.
Sampling Design and Procedures
I studied a sample of documented uses of force from municipalities in one New
Jersey county. A sample is a subset of the population used to estimate the characteristics
of the population (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015; O'Sullivan & Rassel, 2008). The
sampling frame for this study was all uses of force within the county that were
documented by officers employed by the municipal agencies existing within the county
between June 2000 and June 2010 and whose agency RIP and use of force policies are no
more restrictive than mandated by the state. The sampling unit was each use of force
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incident reported by municipal officers within the county during the period being
examined. I collected a total of 1,274 use of force reports from eight municipalities but
discovered that only 499 reports from four municipalities satisfied the requirements of
my study (described later in this chapter). Those 499 reports served as my sampling
frame.
I used a probability design and a stratified proportionate random sample.
Probability designs allow for an equal chance of inclusion in the study for all sampling
units (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). Stratified samples ensure that each stratum is
adequately represented in the sample (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). I used each 12month period of the 10-year study timeframe as a stratum. I selected a random sample of
force reports from each municipality proportionate to their representation in the
population size of each stratum. The five strata before the promulgation of the RIP
directive were combined and analyzed against the combined five strata that came after.
The sample size for this study was established using the Raosoft (2004) sample-size
calculator (.05 significance level and a 95% confidence level). These levels are common
in social science research (Djimeu & Houndolo, 2016). Based on a population estimate of
499, the required sample for this study was 301, with 123 reports from the pre-RIP period
and 178 from the post-RIP period.
Data Collection
The New Jersey use of force reporting form was used to collect data for this
study. The latest version was produced by the NJOAG in 2001 (see Appendix A).
However, previous versions were used over the period studied, which prevented the
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collection of data on officer variables (see the discussion on limitations in Chapter 1).
The reporting form was the most appropriate instrument for this study for four reasons.
First, unlike other criminal investigatory records, completed use of force reporting forms
are releasable under the OPRA and readily available for public review. Second, because
of the mandatory reporting requirements established by law, the form captures all
reported uses of force by municipal police officers. Third, the instrument established a set
of variables which have been examined in scholarly research. No other data sources
provided the consistent breadth of data contained in this instrument.
Other data collection instruments were considered for this study, but they would
not have answered the research question. Five other instruments might have provided
information concerning police officer uses of force, but they each suffer from
shortcomings, as follows:
•

Arrest reports are publicly releasable under OPRA, but there is no
prescribed format for departments to model. The format of arrest reports is
established by each police agency to suit its needs and may not include use
of force information or relevant variables. Any narratives in the arrest report
that might have provided details of force use are subject to redaction.

•

Police blotter/call sheets lack standardization among municipalities and
provide only summaries of incidents that police agencies attended.
Blotter/call sheets likely would have lacked sufficient detail of any force
incident.
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•

Continuation and incident reports were likely to contain some, perhaps all,
of the data needed for this study, but the value of each report is dependent
upon a police officer’s ability to write a comprehensive narrative that
includes a detailed description of the variables leading to the force outcome.
However, despite their potential value, continuation and incident reports are
not releasable under OPRA, and permission to gain access has regularly
been denied by police agencies and court rulings.

•

Force incidents caught on video would have been useful for this study, but
car-mounted video cameras were not common during the first half of this
study period, and body-mounted cameras had not yet been considered a
viable option. Also, reviewing numerous years of video recordings would
have been impractical for only one researcher.

•

Finally, radio transmission recordings are releasable under OPRA but likely
would neither capture all uses of force nor the details surrounding their use.

Data collection was accomplished through the mechanisms established by New
Jersey law. OPRA mandates that all New Jersey government records are subject to public
access with limited exceptions (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-1 et seq.). Government records are
those required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file in the course of official
business by any officer, commission, agency, or authority of New Jersey or its political
subdivisions (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-1.1). All material needed for this study was
categorized as government records under OPRA and relevant case law.
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In addition to identifying publicly available government records, OPRA
prescribes the procedure to request those records. While any of several methods of
communication are permissible, I used the municipal copy of the OPRA request form to
identify the records I wished to collect (see Appendix C for a generic model form). I
requested the following records for the period between June 2000 and June 2010: (a) use
of force policies, (b) RIP policies, (c) aggregate reporting made to the county prosecutor,
and (d) use of force reports. I emailed those request forms directly to each municipal
records custodian to ensure their delivery and to document its receipt via Mailtrack
software. Where necessary, I drove to the municipal clerk to obtain paper copies of my
requested documents but otherwise received those records in portable document format
via email.
Operationalization
The original plan for this study was to examine all variables present on the use of
force reporting form to examine their influence on force outcomes. These variables
included (a) the RIP period, (b) officer sex, (c) officer race, (d) officer age, (e) officer
tenure, (f) officer duty status, (g) officer wear of a uniform, (h) suspect sex, (i) suspect
race, (j) suspect weapon, (k) suspect resistance, and (l) unusual circumstances. I also
planned to use an interaction term, RIP period by suspect race. For various reasons
described here and in Chapter 4, many of these variables were discarded. As a result, I
was only able to use the following variables in my regression analysis, (a) the RIP period,
(b) officer tenure, (c) suspect race, (d) suspect age, (e) suspect resistance, (f) suspect
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unusual conditions, and (g) an interaction term, RIP period by suspect race. The
operationalization of these variables is described in this section.
Independent Variable
The independent variable, a binary variable, was the RIP period indicating the
promulgation of the NJOAG RIP directive. The directive was established as official
policy for all New Jersey police agencies in June 2005. Therefore, the variable was either
the first half of the studied timeframe (June 2000–June 2005) before the promulgation of
the RIP directive or the second half (July 2005–June 2010) after the RIP directive was
established (see Table 3 for coding).
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study was force, an ordinal variable representing
the type of force used by officers. In this study, force was defined as lawful physical
actions undertaken by police officers to protect persons or property or to overcome
suspect resistance during the execution of their public duties that intentionally or
unintentionally attempt or inflict physiological harm, impairment, or death (NJOAG,
2000; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-14(b); 2C:3-3 et seq.; 2C:3-7 et seq.; 2C:11-1 et seq.). In
terms of the New Jersey policy, this definition excludes constructive authority and
physical contact (e.g. verbal commands, pointing a firearm without firing, fingerprinting,
and handcuffing). Neither prompt the reporting requirement, and therefore they were not
reflected in the collected data. Further, this definition excludes illegal uses of force (e.g.,
excessive force), a distinction expressed in the policy.
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Operationalization of force is represented by the options indicated on the New
Jersey use of force reporting form. Force consists forceful actions divided into eight
subcategories (a) compliance hold, (b) hands/fists, (c) kicks/feet, (d) chemical/natural
agent, (e) strike/use baton or other object, (f) canine, (g) firearms discharge, and (h)
other. Firearms discharges are further divided into intentional and accidental discharges.
In this dissertation I examined policy rather than tactics, so I originally planned to
collapse these subcategories into the those specified in the use of force policy, (a)
physical force, (b) mechanical force, and (c) deadly force. However, the collected data
did not produce a single incident of deadly force. Had there been a need to create a
deadly force category, it would have included all firearms discharges. Therefore, the
dependent variable was made dichotomous, physical force and mechanical force (see
Table 1). If more than one level of force was used by an officer, the highest level of force
was used in my analysis.
These two categories are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Physical
force involves behaviors that do not qualify for inclusion in the mechanical force
subcategory. Mechanical force involves behaviors that involve a device, canine, or
substance, other than a firearm. Had instances of deadly force been collected, a third
category of deadly force would have included all forms of force that posed a substantial
risk of causing serious bodily injury or death. See Table 3 for coding.
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Table 1
Collapse of Force Tactics into Force Continuum Subcategories
Physical force
Compliance hold
Hands/fists
Kicks/feet

Mechanical force
Chemical/natural agent
Strike/use baton or other object
Conducted energy device
Canine
Note. The instrument permits officers to choose an additional subcategory of other.
Where a response indicated other, I evaluated the response and entered it into one of
these categories. All collected data points were considered lawful.

Independent Variable of Interest
I examined the influence of the RIP directive on officer uses of force upon people
of different races. Therefore, the subject race variable was particularly important to this
study. Race was operationalized as White and not-White (see Table 3 for coding) and
made a binary variable because the RIP policy does not specify a particular race. Given
that the issues of police trust center around events where Black men were killed by White
police officers (Jones, 2015), the White race was used as the baseline for comparison to
all others. I expected there would be an interaction between the RIP directive and race, so
an interaction term was included in the statistical analyses.
Confounding Variables
In addition to the independent and dependent variables, and the independent
variable of interest, other confounding variables were included based on previous force
literature where each variable has shown mixed influence on force outcomes. They
include suspect characteristics (age, unusual conditions, and resistance), and an officer
characteristic (officer tenure). See Table 5 for coding.
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Suspect age. Age was treated as a continuous variable (see Table 3).
Suspect unusual conditions. Unusual condition is a categorical variable
subcategorized on the use of force report into under the influence and other unusual
condition. The answers provided by officers for other conditions was varied, lacked
consistency, and often indicated multiple conditions. These answers made it difficult to
create defined and exclusive subcategories. Therefore, I treated this variable as binary,
either present or not (see Table 3).
Suspect resistance. Resistance is an ordinal variable identified as suspect actions
on the use of force reporting form. The New Jersey use of force policy does not define
resistance, yet the extant literature has shown that resistance is a significant predictor of
force (Bolger, 2014). The conceptualization of resistance is derived from state law,
policy, and police training material. Resistance is defined as passive, active, and violent
actions and threat of such actions, by subjects that are indicative of a refusal to comply
with the lawful demands of officers (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:29-1 et seq.; 2C:29-2 et seq.;
NJOAG, 2000; New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, 2000). Including threats is
important because it represents an act of defiance on the part of the subject. The threat
implies that any further actions taken by the officer in the execution of their public duties
will be met with that level of resistance. The law does not require officers to desist in
their duties when faced with threatened or actual resistance and allows officers to escalate
force to compel the subject’s compliance (New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice,
2000). Therefore, when the subject indicates either a threat of resistance or presents
actual resistance, officers must accordingly respond to fulfill their duties.
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Because this was a retrospective study, resistance is operationalized according to
the choices indicated on the force reporting form. On the form, resistance is divided into
eight subcategories, (a) resisted police officer control, (b) physical threat/attack on officer
or another, (c) threatened/attacked officer or another with blunt object, (d) threatened/
attacked officer or another with knife/cutting object, (e) threatened/attacked officer or
another with motor vehicle, (f) threatened officer or another with firearm, (g) fired at
officer or another, and (h) other. These subcategories offer options to indicate that
weapons were involved in the act of resistance, causing me to discard the use of a
weapon variable due to independence of observations. These subcategories found on the
form relate to specific tactics of resistance and can be collapsed in a manner similar to
force. The collected data did not provide a sufficient number of observations for
resistance involving more than personal weapons (e.g., hands and fists), causing me to
collapse these eight subcategories into two. They were collapsed into passive and active
resistance (See Table 3). If the suspect used more than one level of resistance, the highest
level of resistance posed by the suspect was used in my analysis. Coding is provided in
Table 3.
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Table 2
Collapse of Suspect Actions Subcategories into the Resistance Continuum
Passive resistance
Resisted police
officer control

Active resistance
Physical threat/attack on officer or another
Threatened/attacked officer or another with blunt object
Threatened/attacked officer or another with knife/cutting
object
Threatened/attacked officer or another with motor vehicle
Threatened officer or another with firearm
Fired at officer or another
Note. The instrument permits officers to choose an additional subcategory of other.
Actions detailed in this category were evaluated for inclusion into these categories.

Officer tenure. This variable indicates the number of years the officer has served
as a police officer. It was treated as continuous variable.
Table 3
Summary and Coding of Variables
Variable Name
RIP period (IV)

Variable Coding
0 = Not promulgated, 1 = Promulgated

Force (DV)

0 = Physical force, 1 = Mechanical force

Suspect race (IV of interest)

0 = White, 1 = Not White

Suspect age

Continuous

Suspect unusual conditions

0 = Not present, 1 = Present

Suspect resistance

0 = Passive, 1 = Active

Office tenure

Continuous

Data Analysis Plan
The collected data was scrubbed and entered into an Excel spreadsheet. Three
hundred and one use of force reports were drawn to fulfill the required sample. Where a
use of force report was found to be incomplete in any variable except officer tenure, it
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was replaced with a complete report from the same year and municipality. In 10 instances
a report was replaced with a randomly chosen report from a neighboring town during the
same year because there were no additional reports from that municipality to choose. The
data from the study sample were entered into an Excel spreadsheet for ultimate analysis
with IBM SPSS Statistics, version 21. I addressed the following research question and
hypotheses in this study:
RQ1: How did the New Jersey RIP directive affect municipal police officer uses
of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county?
Ho1: The New Jersey RIP directive did not significantly affect municipal police
officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county.
Ha1: The New Jersey RIP directive did significantly affect municipal police
officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county.
I used binomial logistic regression to analyze the data and chose to reject the null
hypothesis at the 0.05 level of significance, when the odds ratio shows a difference in
force used between Whites and non-Whites, indicating the RIP directive did significantly
affect municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in
one New Jersey county.
Threats to Validity
Validity is crucial in all research. It represents the best approximation of the truth
in what is being studied. The findings of research may be diminished due to external,
internal, construct, and statistical conclusion validity. This section addresses how those
threats affected this study and how those threats were reduced.
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Threats to external validity may prevent generalizing the findings of research to
populations, but such threats to this study were minimal. The two main threats to external
validity are representativeness of the sample and reactive arrangements (FrankfortNachmias et al., 2015). Ondercin (2004) divided reactive arrangements into artificial
laboratory environments and testing effects. In this study, I used a probability design
incorporating a proportional stratified random sample across various years and
municipalities for a known population to improve the representativeness of the sample.
The historical data used reflects incidents as they occurred during actual police-civilian
encounters and was not affected by a laboratory environment. Finally, it is unlikely that
officers were given a pretest that biased their actions against subjects. The degree of the
external validity threat to this study was minimal and allow for generalization to the
population (use of force incidents within the studied county).
Threats to internal validity reduce confidence in the findings and limit the ability
of the researcher to rule out rival explanations for associations between the independent
and dependent variables, but these threats were significant in this study. Campbell and
Stanley (1963) and Frankfort-Nachmias et al. (2015) explained that history, maturation,
testing, instrumentation, statistical regression, biased selection, experimental mortality,
selection-maturation, and selection-interaction affect internal validity. Many of these
extraneous variables affect experimental research, which this research was not. History,
testing, statistical regression, experimental mortality, selection-maturation, and selectioninteraction, which are influential in experimental studies, are not influential in this
retrospective non-experiment. Still, the other factors were relevant. I avoided biased
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selection through random selection methods for inclusion in the sample. Instrumentation
posed little threat because the variables collected and used in this study were consistent
throughout the reports used in the analysis. However, officers matured during their tenure
in policing, which may have altered their usage of force. Overall, threats to internal
validity were minimal.
Finally, threats to construct and statistical conclusion validity posed little threat to
this research. Construct validity is threatened when test measures do not accurately
measure their intended construct (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The use of force
reporting form was designed in conjunction with New Jersey law and the use of force
policy to accurately measure force and, therefore, has construct validity. Conclusion
validity is threatened when data sets are insufficient. I determined an appropriate sample
size using reliable means. Therefore, the conclusions reached through the chosen
statistical methods were valid.
Ethical Procedures
All necessary steps were taken to ensure this research conformed to the ethical
requirements of Walden University. I gathered data previously and lawfully collected by
others and that are now part of the New Jersey public record. Research involving publicly
available records and archival or secondary data poses little risk to human subjects.
Walden University requires that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) review studies
using data collected by others. All data collection was done in accordance with Walden
IRB approval (#02-14-17-0505878).
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The publicly available data that I collected included information that identified
the subjects, officers, departments, and county involved in each forceful incident.
Reporting this information does not violate confidentiality because state law requires
such information to be made available for public release within 24-hours of the citizen’s
arrest (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-3[b]; 47:1A-10.). Many of the incidents that I gathered for
this study, as well as the identities of those involved in the incident, were reported in the
press. Still, I chose to keep this information confidential in this study.
Despite the lawfulness of identifying suspects, officers, and departments involved
in this study, I was concerned about the safety, security, and well-being of all involved.
Allowing past criminal activity to resurface may cause undue harm for some (Bender &
Crowley, 2015). Identifying the involvement of officers and organizations in uses of
force in the current environment, particularly when examining force use along racial
lines, has the potential to increase physical and economic harm posed to officers, and
social and economic harm to communities (Chang, 2015; Fernandez, Perez-Pena, &
Bromwich, 2016; Jansen, 2016; Yuhas & Laughland, 2016). Therefore, identifying
information of the suspects, officers, and county are not reported in this dissertation.
Paper documents supplying data for this study were physically protected from
loss and unintended disclosure. When not in use, the paper documents were kept a fireresistant safe secured with a key and combination. They will remain secured in the key
and combination safe for 5 years after the publication of this dissertation, at which time
they will be securely destroyed.
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Portable digital format files involved in this study were electronically protected to
prevent loss and unintended disclosure. When not in use, these files were kept in a
password-protected encrypted folder. They will remain secured in the password-protected
encrypted folder for 5-years after the publication of this dissertation, at which time they
will be securely destroyed.
The data for this study were protected from direct and indirect unintentional
disclosure. Only my dissertation committee and I had direct access to protected data. All
demographic details and site descriptions below the state-level were withheld to prevent
releasing the location of the study.
This research presents implications for social change by contributing context and
empirical evidence to the discussion of the public’s trust in the police by examining the
force phenomena and its relationship to the public policy that guarantees equal protection
to all people. It illustrates how previous research has treated the phenomenon and how
future research could better aid civilians, police leaders, and policymakers in advancing
evidence-based public policy. My research also serves as an example to civilians by
showing how they can collect records under the authority of open public records laws and
thoughtfully examine the data to prevail over diminished government transparency where
these data are not regularly published in the public domain. The findings were made
available to all of those required to complete my degree as identified by Walden
University and are now available to civilians, community organizations, participating
agencies, government officials, and the NJOAG, as appropriate.
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Summary
In Chapter 3, I explained that this study examined the influence of the New Jersey
RIP directive on police uses of force to determine if it prevents officers from using race
as a factor in their decisions. I used a nonexperimental retrospective quantitative design
and a proportional stratified random sample for that purpose. The independent variable
was the existence of the RIP directive. The dependent variable was the highest level of
force used by the officer. The independent variable of interest was the race of the subject.
Other variables previously shown to influence force outcomes were controlled during my
analysis. Data were collected from publicly available government records, specifically,
the New Jersey use of force reporting form. In Chapter 4, I will provide the details of my
collected data and the finding of my analysis.

108
Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this retrospective quantitative nonexperimental study was to
examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on officers’ use of force. I sought
to answer the following research question: How did the New Jersey RIP directive affect
municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New
Jersey county? My null hypothesis was that the New Jersey RIP directive did not
significantly affect municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its
implementation in one New Jersey county. My alternate hypothesis was that the New
Jersey RIP directive did significantly affect municipal police officer uses of force on nonWhites after its implementation in one New Jersey county.
To answer the question, I collected the following publicly available records from
municipal police agencies in one New Jersey county: use of force and RIP policies,
aggregate reporting made by municipal police agencies to their county prosecutor, and
use of force reports. I encountered multiple difficulties in collecting the data and
discovered loopholes in the OPRA law that serve to subvert governmental transparency
Nevertheless, once the data were received, they were coded and analyzed using binomial
logistic regression in SPSS. The findings failed to generate the significance level needed
to reject the null hypothesis. However, the results also indicated that the race of the
suspect was not a significant factor in force outcomes for this sample. In this chapter, I
will further discuss my data collection experience and the results of my study.

109
Data Collection
As required by law, I submitted OPRA request forms to the municipal clerks at
each municipality to gather use of force policies, RIP policies, aggregate reporting made
to the county prosecutor, and use of force reports. The requested records consisted of
those effective during or created between July 2000 and June 2010. These OPRA
requests were transmitted to each municipal clerk by email on February 14, 2017, and
tracked using MailTrack software.
The OPRA law indicated that I might receive all reasonably available records
within 7 days and that I might be required to pay special fees. Still, I anticipated that
many of my requested documents would have been placed in archives, so I established a
reasonable data collection period and a ceiling for special assessment charges. Under
OPRA, municipal clerks are required to provide responses to government record requests
within 7 business days and expeditiously deliver records that are currently available and
not in storage (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-5[i]). Where the municipal clerks are unable do so,
they must contact the requestor with an anticipated delivery date to ask for an extension
(N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-5[i]). Where the production of these records requires extraordinary
expenditure of time and equipment, the clerks may assess a special service charge (N.J.
Stat. Ann. 47:1A-5[c]). Based on the initial responses I received from the clerks and their
requests for additional time to fulfill my requests, I assigned March 26, 2017 as the end
date for my data collection period. Most clerks expressed that special assessment charges
would be nominal while others were unsure but suggested it might be costly. Therefore, I
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established a threshold of $250 as the amount I would pay for all special service charges
combined. The result of my effort was mixed.
On March 27, 2017, I received the last set of requested documents used in this
study. My data collection period ended on March 31, 2017 and while I remained open to
the possibility of receiving more records after that date, I did not receive any. The time
needed to provide an initial response to my request and then to provide a complete set of
available records widely differed among the municipalities. The range of time before
receiving initial responses from the clerks ranged from 0 to 11 business days (M = 5 days,
SD = 3), not including the day of my request. Of the eight municipal clerks who provided
records, the time needed to provide the complete set of requested records ranged from 7
to 28 business days (M = 16, SD = 7). This range excludes one business day where all
municipal offices were closed for a major winter storm. I paid $19.20 in total service
charges for these records.
On April 1, 2017, I began to evaluate my data. I examined the provided policies
for conformity with NJOAG guidelines and reviewed the aggregate reporting made to the
county prosecutor. I also constructed an Excel spreadsheet to account for every collected
force reporting form from the agencies that met my assumptions and used it to establish
the sampling frame for the two 5-year periods of my study.
My data collection effort was met with several discrepancies relative to my plan.
Overall, by the end of my collection period, I received records from eight municipal
clerks who I contacted, largely representing communities from the middle and higher
portions of the county’s socioeconomic scale but with lower levels interspersed within
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them. The remaining four clerks recited explanations that included complete record
destruction due to a recent natural disaster, lost or misplaced records, and that a
substantial or indeterminate amount of time was needed to gather them. For those
municipal clerks who did not claim the data were irretrievable, all implied various
degrees of willingness to cooperate, but none fulfilled my request by the end of the
collection period or by June 9, 2017.
The first part of my OPRA request sought police agency use of force policies so
that I could compare them to NJOAG (2000). I received use of force policies from all the
clerks who provided records in response to my request. Of the policies, six were in effect
during all or most of my study period. The other clerks provided the most current version
of the use of force policy dated after my study period, stating that they did not retain
older versions. This violated my assumption that all agencies would retain copies of the
policies that were in effect at that time. Still, none of these municipal police agencies
were certified by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies or the
New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, which would have required more
stringent standards than those mandated by the NJOAG. As a result, their current policies
do not substantially differ from requirements of the NJOAG. Therefore, because the
current policies do not differ from that which was mandated, I continued to assume that
the policies in effect during my study period also conformed with the NJOAG
requirements.
The second part of my OPRA request sought police agency RIP policies so that I
could compare them to NJOAG (2005). The clerks produced the most current version of
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the RIP policy. Four of these policies showed revision histories indicating promulgation
dates years earlier than the 2005 NJOAG mandate (M = 3.5, SD = 0.86). It is an
exceptional finding that the leadership of these departments voluntarily chose to provide
civilians with added protections above the state’s minimum threshold. This finding
resulted in these departments being excluded from my research because of the impact
they would have on the reliability and validity of this study. For the other four policies,
the only date listed shown was when the current version of the policy was approved, and
none included a policy revision history. Again, none of the municipalities were certified
by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies or the New Jersey
State Association of Chiefs of Police, which would have required more stringent
standards than those mandated by the NJOAG. The current policies are nearly mirror
images of the state model. Therefore, I continued to assume that the policies in effect
during my study period also conformed with the NJOAG requirements.
The third part of my OPRA request sought each police agency’s aggregate
reporting of force to the county prosecutor so that I could compare the number of force
reports I received to the official data provided to the prosecutor. The responding
municipal clerks provided a poor response to this request. Of the responses provided by
municipal clerks, only three contained these records. Clerks explained that their police
agencies (a) send copies of the use of force reports in lieu of an aggregate report, (b) lost
or misplaced these records, or (c) are not required to keep copies of these reports once
they are sent to the prosecutor. It is interesting that of the provided aggregate reports,
only 30% of the reported years reflected the frequency of force indicated by officers on
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their force reporting forms; 45% of the documented years were overreported (M = 5.56,
SD = 3.98), and 25% were underreported (M = -3.25, SD = 1.92). In light of the dearth of
county prosecutor aggregate reports and the inaccuracies of those provided, these reports
were not helpful in fulfilling their planned role to confirm the sampling frame.
The final part of my OPRA request sought all individual officer use of force
reporting forms submitted to their agencies so that I could conduct data collection on my
intended variables. The municipal clerks who responded to my OPRA request supplied
1,274 use of force reporting forms representing incidents from 54.17% of the departmentyears I hoped to use in this study. With the removal of the agencies that promulgated a
RIP policy prior to the NJOAG, I was left with 499 use of force reporting forms from
four agencies representing 31.67% of the total department-years I hoped to use in this
study. The collected forms were a mixture of the NJOAG (2000) model report, an older
version of the model NJOAG report, and one agency-created version that did not conform
to the NJOAG model. In many years, officers were permitted to report their force usage
on more than one version of the form. In 10 instances, nonconforming force reports were
randomly selected for inclusion in my sample. These reports were replaced by others
from within the department during that year or from neighboring agencies during that
year which were not otherwise entered into the sample.
Collecting my requested documents was fraught with added complication. These
complications highlight the difference between how the law is written and how it is
actually applied by municipal clerks. First, some of the municipal clerks told me that they
needed to route my request through the county prosecutor for approval. However, all
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municipal clerks in New Jersey were notified by the NJOAG in 2006 that routing
requests through the county prosecutor was improper and that the clerks alone are
responsible for making decisions concerning OPRA requests (H. Goldberg, personal
communication. September 30, 2011). Second, certain clerks unlawfully redacted
documents requiring me to recite statute and case law before they finally delivered
unredacted or lawfully redacted reports. In another similar case, the municipal attorney
redacted the department’s use of force policy, citing the security exception to OPRA.
This was an odd response to my request because the unredacted portions were an exact
copy of the NJOAG model policy (see Appendix B) and the redacted words were easily
discovered. Third, one municipality denied my request citing that it amounted to a
request for the clerk to conduct research, which was prohibited by OPRA. This was an
incorrect and unlawful response, but I was unable to resolve the problem in time to
conduct data analysis despite the involvement of an attorney specializing in OPRA. A
fourth complication involved apparent deceptiveness where an agency effectively denied
having its own use of force policy by sending an exact copy of the NJOAG policy,
completed with a filename of “use of force AG Directive.” This agency also denied the
existence of a RIP policy. A conversation with the clerk revealed that the police
department will not disclose the existence of either policy, citing the security exception
under OPRA. This matter also required the involvement of an OPRA attorney. The lesson
to be learned from this experience is that requestors of public documents must be fully
aware of the OPRA law, its nuances, and previous court decisions, and must be prepared
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to respond with the vehemence allowed by law to ensure that the clerks provide an
appropriate response to their requests.
My final discovery about the operation of the OPRA law directly relates to the
special assessment fee and the missing 46.97% of the years of use of force data I
expected to receive. Large special assessment fees can become an effective denial of a
request. Only three of my requests were met with complete data responses involving all
department-years requested. In most cases, the clerks advised me that they would need to
examine archived records or review every police incident file for each year where the
records were not readily available to see if the files contained a use of force report.
Special assessment fees ranged between $35 to $55 per hour. I was quoted over $500 by
one clerk, and a fee in excess of $300 by another. Because of the cost of these fees, I
instructed the clerks to end their data collection.
Study Results
From the population of 449 force reports, a combined stratified proportionate
random sample of 301 force reporting forms was determined with the use of the Raosoft
(2004) sample-size calculator, a 0.05 significance level, and a 95% confidence level. The
sample consisted of stratums representing 12-month periods and municipal police
agencies. The sample size required for the first five-year period (July 2000 – June 2005)
was 123 documented incidents, representing 90% of the department-years in that period
for those agencies. The average number of force incidents for all departments combined
in each year of the first period was 34 (SD = 20.24). The second 5-year period (July
2005–June 2010) required a sample of 178 documented force incidents, representing
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100% of the department-years in that period for those agencies. The average number of
force incidents for all departments combined in each year of the second period was 65.80
(SD = 9.54).
The sample was drawn and data were entered on the Excel spreadsheet. Unique
labels were created for each of the seven variables used in this study. These variables
have been used in past scholarly research of police uses of force and have been found to
influence force outcomes. Variable data from each report was entered in the appropriate
column exactly as it appeared on the form. Where the officers’ years of service were
missing, I consulted with the Asbury Park Press’s Data Universe to gather publicly
available information from the New Jersey Division of Pension and Benefits, Police and
Fireman’s Retirement System to calculate those degrees of tenure. These data were then
coded as planned (see Table 5) and uploaded to SPSS, version 21 for analysis. The
descriptive characteristics of the variables used in this study are presented in Table 6. My
data use and research design conformed to Walden IRB approval #02-14-17-0505878.
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Table 4
Summary of Descriptive Statistics of the Study Sample (N = 301)
Variables
Officer force
Physical
Mechanical
Officer years of tenure
Observations
Mean [range]
Stand. Dev.
Suspect race
White
Not-White
Suspect age
Observations
Mean [range]
Stand. Dev.
Suspect resistance
Passive
Active
Unusual conditions
Not present
Present

Pre-RIP (n = 123)

Post-RIP (n = 178)

98
25

147
31

93
7.39 [0 – 29]
6.16

170
8.18 [0 – 27]
6.13

61
62

104
74

123
31.87 [12 – 62]
13.49

178
33.42 [15 – 70]
12.93

76
47

110
68

78
45

80
98

I used binomial logistic regression to conduct my data analysis. Binomial logistic
regression attempts to predict the probability of categorical outcomes given certain
independent variables but requires the satisfaction of several assumptions. Laerd
Statistics (2015) explained that the assumptions begin with a dependent variable that is
ordinal, and independent variables that are continuous, ordinal, or categorical. All
variables must have independence of observations, be mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive, and must have at least 15 observations (Laerd Statistics, 2015). Additionally,
there must be a linear relationship between the continuous variables and the logit
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transformation of the dependent variable, no multicollinearity, and no significant outliers
(Laerd Statistics, 2015).
The statistical assumptions concerning my variables were satisfied in the
following ways prior to analysis. As indicated in Table 6, the dependent variable, officer
force, is ordinal and dichotomous. It is ordinal because in the NJOAG (2000) policy
physical force is considered a lesser severity than mechanical force. The independent
variables, suspect race and unusual conditions, are categorical, and their possible values
are not ordered (see Table 6). Suspect resistance is ordinal, as passive resistance requires
no threat to the officer while active resistance indicates an increase in threatening
behavior or an attack upon the officer. Suspect resistance is treated as a continuous
variable in this regression. Officer years of tenure and suspect age are continuous (see
Table 6). All variables possess independence of observations as none are not affected by
common influences. Variables are related in such a way that observation in one precludes
observation in any other variable or category. All variable categories cover the entire
realm of possibilities and are therefore collectively exhaustive.
The number of observations within the originally planned variables for this study
presented a challenge to some factors but was overcome by discarding certain variables
and collapsing the subcategories of the suspect resistance variable. I originally had hoped
to include the variables (a) officer sex, (b) officer race, (c) officer duty status, and (d)
suspect sex. Unfortunately, there were fewer than 15 female observations in either sex
variable and too few observations of non-White officers and off-duty officers. These
variables were necessarily discarded from my analysis. Also, the suspect resistance
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variable did not allow me to include more levels of resistance. The more severe forms of
suspect resistance, mechanical resistance (use of a device or substance that was not a
firearm) and deadly resistance (use of a firearm or other device or substance that posed a
substantial risk of death or which caused serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ), had fewer than 15
observations in either period. I combined them with physical resistance to create the
subcategory called active resistance. This resulted in the suspect resistance category
becoming binary. Once this process was completed, I determine that all variables
contained 15 or more observations (see Table 6).
Prior to conducting the final regression, I performed analysis of my variables for
linearity to the logit transformation of the dependent variable. To test for linearity, I
conducted a binomial logistic regression using the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. This
procedure required that I create natural log transformations of the continuous variables
and interaction terms with their respective variable (e.g., natural log of officer tenure by
officer tenure). All were all entered into the binomial regression. Tabachnick and Fidell
(2007) recommended that a Bonferonni correction be applied to account for multiple
comparisons of all the terms in the regression, including the intercept, before interpreting
the results. This required me to divide the commonly accepted significance level of .05
by the 10 terms in my regression. As a result, I accepted significance at .005 and I
discovered that the officer tenure variable violated the assumption (p = .003). I created a
histogram of the variable and found it was positively skewed. Therefore, I transformed
the variable to its square root and repeated the regression. Once again, significance was
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accepted at .005. The results of the second regression indicated that all continuous
independent variables were linearly related to the logit transformation of the dependent
variable.
Finally, before conducting the final regression, I examined my data for highly
correlated variables (multicollinearity). I performed a bivariate correlation using the
Spearman coefficient to detect monotonic relationships. I found that the transformed
officer tenure variable correlated above .8 with officer age. I then performed a multiple
regression to examine more closely for multicollinearity by obtaining standard errors,
tolerances, and variance inflation factors (VIF). I found that the highest VIF values were
the transformed officer tenure and officer age, at 2.89 and 2.92, respectively. While these
values showed moderate correlation, I decided these variables warranted additional
attention, as younger officers will typically have fewer years of service. Since I obtained
more data on officer tenure than officer age, I elected to discard the officer age variable
from further analysis. I then conducted another test for linearity and multicollinearity. All
continuous variables were found to be linearly related to the logit transformation of the
dependent variable (officer force). No variables showed significant correlation with each
other and none shared a large portion of their variance with other variables (see Table 7).
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Table 5
Test for Multicollinearity
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

.108

.101

RIP period

-.031

.049

Transformed officer tenure

.054

Suspect race
Suspect age

t

Sig.

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance

VIF

1.075

.283

-.037

-.628

.530

.975

1.025

.021

.155

2.639

.009

.984

1.016

.081

.049

.101

1.636

.103

.890

1.124

-.004

.002

-.132

-2.165

.031

.913

1.096

Suspect resistance

.193

.048

.239

4.049

.000

.973

1.028

Unusual conditions

-.028

.048

-.036

-.591

.555

.927

1.079

a. Dependent variable: Officer force

My final test of assumptions involved the detection of outliers, leverage, or
influential points during the final regression analysis. The analysis indicated 14
studentized residuals with values of 2.5 or greater standard deviations existed in the data.
Upon closer examination, I discovered that these cases involved officers use of
mechanical force in response to low levels of resistance. These force responses are
permitted by law and policy, so I elected to keep these cases in my analysis.
I performed the binomial logistic regression to ascertain how the New Jersey RIP
directive affected municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its
implementation in one New Jersey county. My logistic regression model was statistically
significant, χ2 (7) = 38.484, p < .05. The model had a good fit based on Hosmer and
Lemeshow, p = .195. The model explained 21.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in
force use and correctly classified 81.4% of cases. Sensitivity was 15.4%, specificity was
97.6%, positive predictive value was 61.54%, and negative predictive value was 82.4%.
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Of the seven independent variables, three were statistically significant: officer tenure,
suspect age, and suspect resistance (see Table 8). Increases associated with officer tenure
were associated with an increased likelihood of using mechanical force. Increases
associated with suspect age were associated with a decreased likelihood of mechanical
force. Finally, increased suspect resistance was associated with increased use of
mechanical force by the officers. Neither the interaction term (RIP period by suspect
race) nor suspect race were significant. Based on these findings, I could not reject the null
hypothesis which states that the New Jersey RIP directive had no significant effect on
municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New
Jersey county.
Table 6
Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis (n = 301)
Variable

RIP period

B

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

95% C.I for EXP(B)
Lower

Upper

-.705

.505

1.949

1

.163

.494

.184

1.329

Officer tenure

.353

.150

5.578

1

.018

1.424

1.062

1.909

Suspect race

.048

.562

.007

1

.931

1.050

.349

3.155

Suspect age

-.036

.015

5.416

1

.020

.965

.936

.994

Suspect resistance

1.282

.346

13.735

1

.000

3.605

1.830

7.102

Unusual conditions

-.056

.361

.024

1

.878

.946

.466

1.921

.892

.699

1.627

1

.202

2.439

.620

9.602

Interaction RIP period
by Suspect race

Model χ2 = 38.484 p < .05
Hosmer and Lemeshow = .195
Nagelkerke R2 = .216

Note. All variables were calculated during simultaneous analysis.
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Despite my inability to reject the null hypothesis, the findings are still an
important indicator of the value of the RIP directive. The results indicated that race was
not a factor in force outcomes over this 10-year period. I chose to explore this significant
finding more closely. I examined each period individually to establish if race had been a
factor in force outcomes either before or after the promulgation of the RIP directive. The
RIP period variable and interaction term were removed from the model. Although the
samples were small, I found that race was not a significant factor in force outcomes
during either period.
The logistic regression model for the pre-RIP period was statistically significant,
χ2 (5) = 17.90, p < .05. The model had a good fit based on Hosmer and Lemeshow, p =
.337. The model explained 26.7% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in force use and
correctly classified 78.5% of cases. Sensitivity was 28.6%, specificity was 93.1%,
positive predictive value was 54.54% and negative predictive value was 81.70%. The
analysis indicated two studentized residuals with values of 2.5 or greater standard
deviations existed in the data that involved cases where officers used of mechanical force
in response to low levels of resistance. This force response is permitted by law and
policy, so these cases were kept in the model. Of the variables, only one was significant,
suspect resistance, for which increasing resistance was associated with a greater
likelihood of mechanical force (see Table 9). Therefore, race was not a significant factor
in force outcomes during this period. This finding gives the appearance that the RIP
directive was unnecessary from a practical standpoint for this sample. Although, given
the 1999 consent decree between the NJSP and the USAG which settled a 42 USC §
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14141 lawsuit, the promulgation of the RIP directive to all police agencies in the state
was, if nothing else, a political necessity.
The logistic regression model for the post-RIP period was statistically significant,
χ2 (5) = 22.33, p < .05. The model had a good fit based on Hosmer and Lemeshow, p =
.062. The model explained 20.1% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in force use and
correctly classified 82.4% of cases. Sensitivity was 16.1%, specificity was 97.1%,
positive predictive value was 55.56% and negative predictive value was 83.85%. The
analysis indicated 11 studentized residuals with values of 2.5 or greater standard
deviations existed in the data that involved cases where officers used of mechanical force
in response to low levels of resistance. Again, that force response is permitted by law and
policy, so these cases were kept in the model. Three variables were found to be
significant, officer tenure, suspect age, and suspect resistance (see Table 10). Increases
associated with officer tenure were associated with an increased likelihood of using
mechanical force. Increases associated with suspect age were associated with a decreased
likelihood of mechanical force. Suspect resistance was associated with increased use of
mechanical force by the officers. Once again, race was not a significant factor in force
outcomes.
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Table 7
Pre-RIP Period Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis (n = 123)
Variable

B

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B) 95% C.I for EXP(B)
Lower

Upper

Officer tenure

.321

.245

1.720

1

.190

1.378

.853

2.226

Suspect race

.154

.616

.062

1

.803

1.116

.349

3.899

Suspect age

-.051

.026

3.727

1

.054

.951

.903

1.001

Suspect resistance

1.707

.598

8.150

1

.004

5.512

1.707

17.794

Unusual conditions

.463

.322

.553

1

.457

1.588

.469

5.378

Model χ2 = 17.940, p < .05
Hosmer and Lemeshow = .337
Nagelkerke R2 =.267

Note. All variables were calculated during simultaneous analysis.

Table 8
Post-RIP Period Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis (n = 178)
Variable

B

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B) 95% C.I for EXP(B)
Lower

Upper

Officer tenure

.409

.194

4.454

1

.035

1.506

1.030

2.203

Suspect race

.864

.451

3.661

1

.056

2.372

.979

5.746

Suspect age

-.029

.019

2.289

1

.130

.971

.936

1.009

Suspect resistance

1.004

.431

5.412

1

.020

2.728

1.171

6.355

Unusual conditions

-.379

.448

.715

1

.398

.685

.285

1.647

Model χ2 = 22.333, p < .05
Hosmer and Lemeshow = .062
Nagelkerke R2 = .201

Note. All variables were calculated during simultaneous analysis.
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Summary
In this chapter, I described my data collection and analysis processes. I further
reported the difficulties that I encountered in collecting publicly available information
from the municipal agencies that I intended to study. I designed this retrospective
quantitative nonexperimental study to examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP
directive on officer uses of force in one New Jersey county to determine if the policy
altered force outcomes for non-Whites after its implementation in June 2005. My
inferential analysis revealed that only officer tenure, suspect age, and suspect resistance
significantly influenced officer uses of mechanical force between July 2000 and June
2010. Therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. The New Jersey RIP directive had
no effect on officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in the studied
county. Further analysis revealed that the race of the suspect was not a significant factor
in force outcomes in either period. In Chapter 5, I will provide an interpretation of my
findings and discuss their implication on public policy and social change.

127
Chapter 5: Discussion
Introduction
The purpose of this retrospective quantitative nonexperimental study was to
examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on officer uses of force to
determine if the promulgation of the policy in 2005 altered force outcomes for nonWhites in one New Jersey county. If the administrative rule was effective at preventing
RIP, then the application of force should not have disproportionately impacted any racial
category after the RIP directive was implemented. Using publicly available police agency
records, I conducted a binomial logistic regression on data from a stratified random
sample consisting of the 5-year period before and after the promulgation of the New
Jersey RIP directive. An interaction term was used for the RIP period by race to account
for the influence of the directive on suspect race. My results show that the RIP directive
did not significantly affect force outcomes for non-Whites. In this chapter, I will provide
an interpretation of my findings, discuss issues related to the limitations of this study,
offer recommendations for further research, and discuss the implications these findings
may have for social change.
Interpretation of the Findings
As described in Chapter 3, the state of research into police uses of force is marred
with problems concerning the conceptualization and operationalization of force. I am
cautious in drawing comparisons to those studies because few researchers have
approached the topic with the conceptualization or operationalization used here. Despite
the differences between my study and the existing literature, my findings support
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previous discoveries regarding the degree of force used by officers. My findings indicate
that 81% of the force used by officers was of the lowest level of force possible (physical
force). Garner et al. (2002), Lawton (2007), and Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) also found
that officers more commonly apply lower levels of force. While conceptualizations and
operationalizations differ among those studies and mine, all have shown that officers tend
toward lower levels of force.
Instead of attempting to draw other comparisons to dissimilar studies, I will
compare the results discovered in this study with the results from a meta-analysis of force
studies by Bolger (2014) who sought to identify key correlates of police decisions to use
force. The intent of that study was to permit other researchers to overcome some of the
difficulty in comparing prior research by allowing them to directly compare their findings
to the findings in his meta-analytic review (Bolger, 2014).
Bolger (2014) admitted significant methodological limitations in the analysis but
established that variables tapping into encounter and suspect characteristics show the
greatest impact on the likelihood of force being used. Variables in Bolger’s study that
have consistently shown an increase in the likelihood of force include evidence of
criminal behavior, weapon possession, suspect resistance, and arrest. The race of the
suspect was also found to be significant despite the prior research finding mixed results.
Unfortunately, the nature of my retrospective research using government records
prevents me from drawing comparisons to Bolger’s results for criminal behavior, weapon
possession, and arrest. The data I collected indicated a great amount of uncertainty
surrounding these variables because of missing contextual data, errors and omissions in
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the officer answers, or insufficient frequencies. For example, while criminal charges were
often listed, they generally took the form of statute titles or incomplete statutes numbers.
Because many statutes provide for a range of similar offenses and offense levels, it
became impossible in many cases to determine the exact criminal behavior for which the
suspect was charged. This issue complicated the interpretation of weapon possession. The
charges gave rise to ambiguity regarding officer awareness of the weapon prior to using
force and made useless any possibility of using an assumption of foreknowledge. Also,
there were insufficient instances where arrests were not made to draw valid conclusions.
Nonetheless, I could compare my findings to two variables correlating significantly to
force outcomes presented by Bolger.
Bolger (2014) determined that resistance increases the likelihood of force use. My
finding extends that conclusion. While my study did not examine resistance relative to
compliance, it did examine passive resistance as well as active resistance to determine the
likelihood of mechanical force usage. Active resistance included threats and use of
physical, mechanical, and deadly resistance. I found that active resistance increased the
likelihood that an officer would respond with mechanical force.
Bolger (2014) also determined that the race of the suspect was a significant factor
in force outcomes. In particular, minorities were more likely to have force used against
them. My findings disconfirm that hypothesis. I found that the race of the suspect was not
a significant factor in force outcomes over the 10-year period of my study and in either of
the two 5-years periods examined.
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In addition to the concrete findings of the meta-analysis, Bolger (2014) also
correctly criticized the available research into intoxication and force outcomes because
they failed to draw distinctions between alcohol and drugs. This was an issue present in
my unusual condition variable. While many reports did provide some indication of the
type of alleged suspect intoxication, many others were simply described as under the
influence. Therefore, I was unable to extend knowledge regarding this variable.
Although not found to be significant by Bolger (2014), my findings provide the
first indication of other significant factors influencing force outcomes under the New
Jersey policy paradigm. The data reflected that increasing officer tenure is directly
correlated with increased mechanical force. Advancing suspect age is inversely related to
the use of mechanical force.
A final observation about my results concerns the 14 cases identified as
studentized residuals. These cases involved instances where suspects offered passive
resistance (10 cases) and active resistance (four cases). In all cases, officers responded to
the posed resistance with mechanical force using chemical spray in 11 of these cases,
baton strikes in two, and a K-9 in one. In the 10 cases of passive resistance, the officers’
lawfully chose not to respond with physical force but instead used the next higher level of
force, mechanical force. I have no other data to help further analyze these cases but they
do offer at least two possibilities. These observations might reflect lawful but awful force
where the force used was in compliance with policy but may give rise to the potential for
excessiveness. They may also represent officers’ sound judgment in fulfilling their
official duties by choosing to minimize the potential for injuries to the suspects and
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themselves, particularly in the instances where chemical sprays (e.g., oleoresin capsicum
[OC spray]) were used. Using chemical sprays has been found to quickly incapacitate
suspects and is associated with lower rates or injury to both suspects and officers (see
Smith et al., 2010). However, more data are needed to draw conclusions.
My research does allow for more than a simple comparison to prior research. The
experience of collecting and analyzing the data are relevant to the context of my
theoretical framework, Lipsky’s SLBT. My study generated three types of findings
relative to this theory. The first relates to my experience utilizing the OPRA law to
collect data for municipalities. The second involved the auditing of police actions through
paperwork. The third related to the supervision of officers.
Lipsky (2010) theorized that SLBs resist controls over their discretion because
their priorities differ from their managers. They exercise their discretion in a manner
consistent with their preferences to minimize real dangers and discomforts. In this study,
I exercised my right as a citizen to oversee the function of police agencies and their
employees through the use the New Jersey OPRA law. My requests were met with the
several difficulties explained in Chapter 4. One reason might be that the collection of
police use of force data during this difficult period in history might have posed a
subjective degree of danger and discomfort to the municipal clerk or other municipal
personnel. I received several unlawful responses to my requests that required me to make
calls and send emails explaining my familiarity with statute and case law before I
received my requested records. In a small number of cases, I had to retain the services of
a lawyer. While these actions resolved several of my data collection problems, I still had
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not received all the information that I requested. Lipsky’s notion that SLBs resist
controls over their discretion is supported by my data collection experience.
Lipsky (2010) further theorized that SLBs use of discretion is not unrestrained by
rules or directives, but that such efforts achieve limited success when not supported by
significant sanctions to help achieve desired behaviors. The New Jersey OPRA law offers
sanctions but the degree of their usefulness is questionable. The New Jersey OPRA law
provides for escalating monetary penalties to be assessed to any public official who
knowingly or willfully violates the provisions of the law (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-11). It
also allows for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees by the requestor should the
requestor prevail in court (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-6). There may also be additional
sanctions offered by municipal governments, but I did pose that question during my data
collection. Based on my data collection experience, the sanctions provided in the OPRA
law do not serve as a sufficient deterrent to prevent violations of the law. Circumstantial
evidence might endorse the conclusion that the clerks’ or supporting public officials
ignored the potential fines and knowingly and willfully provided intentionally unlawful
responses to my requests. Still, this is only one possibility, and the burden of proof to
buttress this conclusion is high. Another and perhaps more likely possibility is that the
clerks and supporting public officials were not sufficiently trained on the operation of the
OPRA law and that the risk of paying court assessed legal fees is preferable to municipal
leaders than the actual cost of training personnel to ensure the correct application of the
law. Whatever the actual motivations were that complicated my data collection, the
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sanctions enumerated in the OPRA law do not compel complete compliance with the law
and support Lipsky’s belief that insignificant sanctions do not restrain SLB discretion.
Lipsky (2010) explained that the auditing of SLB behaviors is complicated when
SLBs complete paperwork in a way that guards against later adverse inspection. Through
various methods, SLBs can capitalize on weaknesses inherent with insufficient
supervision to maintain control of their work despite the controls applied by
management. This notion was grossly apparent in the force reporting forms I collected.
Officers commonly submitted incomplete forms. These omissions limited my ability to
examine officer variables and ultimately altered my original research and analysis plan.
Were it not for the Asbury Park Press’s Data Universe (http://php.app.com/agent/), which
reports publicly available pension data, I would have lost the ability to include any officer
variables in my study. While I cannot conclude that officers willfully omitted information
from their reports, my study does support Lipsky’s (2010) assertion about auditing of
SLB behaviors through paperwork.
The New Jersey RIP directive and Use of Force guideline do conform with
Lipsky’s (2010) need for rules to be clear, unambiguous, and supported by significant
sanctions. The New Jersey RIP directive is an explicit and unequivocal order to all police
officers in the state forbidding the use of race as a factor in their discretionary actions.
The Use of Force guideline is slightly ambiguous because it is impossible to create an
algorithm addressing all possible scenarios an officer might face. Instead, the Use of
Force guideline provides defined limits that can be applied to all scenarios given the
totality of the circumstances faced by the officer. Both the RIP directive and Use of Force

134
guideline follow the Davis (1969, 1975) model for confining, structuring, and checking
officer behavior. They are supported by disciplinary processes subjecting violative
officers to agency sanction, criminal prosecution, and civil litigation under state
administrative, criminal, and tort laws; and under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. They are also
supported by laws that subject agencies permitting the existence of a pattern or practice
of violations to litigation from the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and
civil litigation for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Sufficient supervision is
the obvious requirement to make both these rules work as devised.
Lipsky (2010) argued that when supervision is minimal, the evaluation of SLBs
becomes difficult as supervisors are unable to directly observe the intangible factors
leading to SLB decisions. This notion is true, especially in policing, because most
officers work with little direct supervision. Still, extant research shows that it is possible
to examine force outcomes for intangible factors used in officer decisions through data
analysis. Despite my inability to directly observe the actions of these officers, I was able
to provide a degree of supervision by examining their force reporting forms. I discovered
that even during the period when the RIP directive was not promulgated, officers still
provided equal protection to all citizens from unlawful force.
Ultimately, my observations during the data collection process support some of
Lipsky’s (2010) conclusions regarding the operation of the OPRA law. However, my data
analysis of the force used by police officers did not uncover evidence of Lipsky’s
theorized coping mechanisms reflecting racial bias.
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Limitations of the Study
My retrospective quantitative nonexperimental study suffered from limitations,
particularly those of effectively denied access, a relatively small sample size, and a lack
of available data. These limitations affected my analysis. As a result, they affected my
findings and conclusions.
I had expected to receive all the data I requested, given the published records
retention schedule defined by the New Jersey Division of Archives and Records
Management and the right to access legislated in the OPRA law. For this reason,
combined with issues of practicality and avoidance of extensive travel throughout the
state, I elected to examine only one county. Unfortunately, by the end of my study, I had
not received data from one third of those agencies from which I had made a request. As
such, I collected no instances of deadly force used by officers, leaving me to examine
only physical and mechanical force.
I did not expect to discover agencies had promulgated a RIP directive before the
state’s mandate in 2005. While this discovery indicates a positive social and political step
on the part of those agencies, it forced me to exclude them from my examination and
reduced my sample size. This did not prevent me from finding significant results, but
when combined with the issue of limited data, it did prevent me from fully exploring the
complete set of variables present in the force reporting forms.
I expected to find instances of incomplete forms but had not imagined that I
would have encountered so many of them. The number of incomplete reports left me with
far too few observations of officer characteristics to analyze. As a result, I had to drop
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several officer characteristic variables that had been demonstrated in prior literature to be
an important factor in force use.
Included in the limitation described above was the lack of data regarding officer
gender. I overcame this limitation by using the putative sound of the reporting officers’
names listed on the reports. In very few instances were the names androgynous.
However, the sample did not generate enough female officers for analysis, and the
variable was dropped from examination.
Despite the identified limitations, my study involved observations that were not
complicated by artificial laboratory environments or testing effects, and which were
selected for analysis using a stratified random sample. Typical validity threats present in
experimental testing were not present here, except for the maturation of the officers over
the 10 years examined. The method of collecting data was consistent throughout this
period. Therefore, the results of this study are valid, reliable, and trustworthy. Still, given
the small sample size, great caution should be exercised in generalizing the results
beyond the sample.
Recommendations
My research used data collected from one New Jersey county to determine how
the New Jersey RIP directive affected municipal police officer uses of force on nonWhites after its implementation. Future research seeking to more broadly examine this
influence should not be as limited and should include data collected from multiple
municipalities across the state. However, researchers should be cautious in extending the
timeframe from that found in this study and should do so only after thorough
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consideration of the policy nuances present during those added periods. Careful attention
should be paid to data collection and development of the sample.
I recommend that future researchers collect data in two parts, starting with OPRA
requests for the relevant policies and aggregate reporting made to the county prosecutor
followed by requests for the use of force reports. These requests should be directed to the
clerks of a stratified proportionate random sample of municipalities representing the full
range of socioeconomic and urban-rural classifications present in the state, as well as, the
range of small, medium, and large police departments found here. The first part of the
data collection would allow the researchers to discover anomalous agencies that
promulgated their own RIP directives prior to the state and adjust their sample or
statistical method. It would also offer insight into the degree of cooperation they can
expect to receive from those municipalities prior to the second part, the OPRA requests
for the use of force reports. The initial request would also provide an opportunity to
develop a concrete sampling frame prior to the second OPRA request for the use of force
reports, provided that the agencies retained their aggregate reports and correctly reported
the force used by officers. The second request may expose the researchers to the potential
for the difficulties present in my study, so the experiences found in the first request may
help the researcher prepare for those difficulties.
While the OPRA law indicates that complete data collection should occur in an
expeditious fashion, the reality did not live up to that expectation. I recommend that
researchers be prepared to keep their data collection period open for several months and
have a prepared cash reserve to pay special service charges. It would also be useful to
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have an attorney who specializes in the OPRA law to help prepare and follow-up with the
OPRA requests.
Unlike this study, future researchers examining a larger area of the state would
inevitably collect the complete range of force options available to officers and lead to
greater statistical scrutiny. Binomial logistic regression would not be sufficient to analyze
data with more force options. Prior researchers have used ordered probit to analyze a
larger number of force options with sufficient observations. However, Terrill et al. (2008)
found that when analyzing force data, the suspect race variable could be statistically
insignificant in an ordered probit analysis but statistically significant in a hierarchical
logistic model. Therefore, after collecting their data, researchers should consult with their
statistical advisors to derive the most appropriate statistical method for use in their study.
I also recommend conducting similar studies in different locations. The
promulgation of RIP directives is still a relatively new practice in the police enterprise.
Where force reporting forms are publicly available, researchers presently have better
opportunities to collect data than they might in the future before records are archived,
lost, or destroyed, and perhaps before public access is restricted. Researchers conducting
similar studies in other states should also be prepared to have extended collection periods,
reserved funds to pay special service fees, and to enlist the help of an attorney
knowledgeable in the applicable laws concerning public access to government records.
Future research, either in New Jersey of elsewhere, would greatly benefit from
contrasting these force incidents against the total number of police-citizen encounters.
Currently, in New Jersey, there is no mandated or consistent method among agencies

139
regarding how these incidents are logged. Overcoming this challenge would likely
require an agreement with the police agencies being studied so that archival data can be
accessed and non-encounters properly eliminated from the comparison (e.g., perimeter
checks of local businesses for attempted or completed burglaries).
Finally, while I sought to examine the influence of a rule on police uses of force,
the nature of police use of force itself was necessarily examined. The literature review
uncovered problems with the operationalization and conceptualization of force across the
scholarly realm, which did not adequately reflect the phenomena or its interaction with
policy in the field. Future force studies should bridge this scholar-practitioner divide.
Also, better instrumentation that collects suspect, officer, encounter, neighborhood, and
organizational characteristics is needed to leverage research and networks that influence
force policies. Instrumentation should be developed through community-based research
practices that reflect community needs and the needs of public policymakers so future
research findings can better serve the community, police, policymakers, and scholars.
Implications for Positive Social Change
Walden University requires that doctoral students explore how their research can
impact positive social change. I sought to create social change by contributing context
and empirical evidence to the discussion of the public’s trust in the police by examining
the force phenomena and its relationship to a public policy guaranteeing equal protection
to all people. I intended my research to illustrate how previous research has treated the
phenomenon and how future research could better aid civilians, police leaders, and
policymakers in advancing evidence-based public policy. I also intended my research to

140
show civilians how they can collect records under the authority of an open public records
law and thoughtfully examine the data to prevail over diminished government
transparency where these data are not regularly published in the public domain.
My study contributes to social change on a broad scale by alerting civilians,
police practitioners, public policymakers, and scholars to the troubles inherent in their
communications between and among themselves and the role this communication plays
in the distrust of the police. Current discussions and scholarly research are muddled by
basic conceptions that widely differ and by insufficient concrete relatable data. In
providing a commentary about the largely uncertain extent of the phenomenon, opaque
conceptualizations, and the current state of research, this dissertation can bolster police
legitimacy and improve trust between the public and police by serving as a primer to
begin greater and clearer discourse, and serve as the starting point on the map leading to
studies better capable of informing the public, police practitioners, and policymakers
during their pursuit of just and effective public policies.
My study contributes to social change in New Jersey by offering to police
practitioners and policymakers the first known analysis of the interaction between two
policies that influence officer uses of force and impact the trust between the public and
police. It illustrates areas in policy requiring improvement but serves as testimony to
government officials of the value of examining their records as a regular method to detect
and resolve disparate treatment of minority populations and to discover positive findings
that inspire trust in the police and strengthen legitimacy. These findings contained herein
demonstrate that this sample of officers made race-neutral force decisions contrary to
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opinions presented in national surveys and serve as an affirmation of their dependability
to use force appropriately. Despite these findings public trust in police remains low
revealing that deeper issues must exist and indicates to New Jersey police practitioners
and policymakers that additional efforts are needed to uncover and rectify issues affecting
the problems of public trust in the police and police legitimacy.
Perhaps the largest contribution that my study makes to social change is by
serving as an exemplar that civilians can use to regularly conduct and maintain oversight
of their police agencies. By taking advantage of their rights under open public record
laws, civilians can obtain access to reports not normally published by police agencies so
that they may evaluate the actions of officers. Vigilance of this nature increases the
transparency of police agencies and improves police accountability by putting police on
notice that civilians intend to enforce the social contract between them for the provision
of equal protection and security. Also, increased civilian awareness and regular use of
these laws will serve to challenge future administrative and legislative efforts that may
seek to reduce the scope or power of these laws.
Conclusion
The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) has acknowledged the
problem of trust between the community and the police and recommended that police
agencies throughout the nation institute policies outlawing the practice of RIP while
citing only anecdotal evidence of its value. The experiences of New Jersey municipal
police officers afforded an opportunity to examine the value of such a rule. My
examination uncovered no confirmation of biased-based force use in this sample. Officers
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have maintained a policy of using force in a race-neutral manner. Notwithstanding my
results, the promulgation and enforcement of policies outlawing the practice of RIP is a
practical initial step to ensuring the equal protection of all people and clearly and
profoundly demonstrates the government’s willingness to hold police accountable for
unlawful acts and to treat everyone equally.
In hopes of contributing to positive social change, I examined the use of force by
municipal police officers in one New Jersey county to determine if an administrative rule
could prevent RIP. My results do not provide evidence that administrative rules prevent
RIP and may raise questions regarding the need for these policies. However, this was the
first study of its kind and used a small sample with a limited number of variables. Thus,
this study should serve as a call to action for civilians, practitioners, policymakers, and
researchers to examine this topic elsewhere so that their findings may help influence
public policies that enhance public trust in the police and strengthen police legitimacy.
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